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THE LAW OF WORDS: STANDING, ENVIRONMENT, 
AND OTHER CONTESTED TERMS 
David N. Cassuto* 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 
528 U.S. 167 (2000). exposes fundamental incoherencies within environ- 
mental standing doctrine, even while it ostensibly makes standing easier to 
prove for plaintiffs in environmental citizen suits. According to Laidlaw, an 
environmental plaintiff needs only to show personal injury to satisfy Article 
111's standing requirement; she need not show that the alleged statutory 
violation actually harms the environment. This Article argues that Laidlaw's 
distinction between injury to the plaintiff and harm to the environment is 
nonsensical. Both the majority and dissent in Laidlaw incorrectly assume 
that there exists an objective standard by which a plainti8 society or a court 
can measure harm or injury. Using examples drawn both from history (the 
Trail Smelter Arbitration (193M1))  and fiction (Barbara Kingsolver's novel 
Animal Dreams), this Article illustrates that the inherent contingency of 
language renders it impossible to dejine harm or injury without acknowledging 
the systemic perspective from which the concepts are viewed. 
The path to an intelligible standing doctrine lies not in focusing on this 
artijicial opposition, but instead in acknowledging statutory violations as 
injurious to the social and legal system of which we all form a part. Assum- 
ing the violated statute contains a citizen suit provision, the resulting harm 
to the system could and should enable individuals to sue. This policy would 
conform the Court's standing jurisprudence to the language and intent of 
the statutes before it. Moreover, this policy would counter the undermining 
of the rhetoric of environmental protection that persists so long as the Su- 
preme Court continues its frequent yet unsuccessful efforts to retool its dejini- 
tion of cognizable legal injury. 
This Article is about one sentence. The sentence, found in the majority 
opinion of Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services 
(TOC), Inc.,' reads as follows: 
Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; B.A., Wesleyan Univer- 
sity; J.D., University of California at Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law; Ph.D., Indiana 
University. I would like to thank William Fletcher, Ben Gershman, Don Doernberg, John 
Nolon, Ann Powers, Jeffrey Miller, Jerrob Duffy, Arthur Haubenstock, and Ike and Tobby 
Cassuto for their insights, comments, and help with this Article, and Brian Brittingham for 
his research assistance. A very special thanks to Elizabeth Downes, my partner in every- 
thing, who made this piece possible. 
528 U.S. 167 (2000) [hereinafter Laidlaw IV]. Since the Article discusses two district 
court opinions, a Fourth Circuit appeal, and a Supreme Court case with the same case 
name, the Article will employ a numbering system for all of the Friends of the Earth, Inc. 
v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., decisions: 890 F. Supp. 470 (D.S.C. 1995) 
[hereinafter Luidlaw 4, 956 F. Supp. 588 (D.S.C. 1997) [hereinafter Laidlaw 111, 149 F.3d 
303 (4th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter Laidlaw IIg. 
Heinonline - -  28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 79 2004 
80 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 28 
The relevant showing for purposes of Article I11 standing . . . i s  
not injury to the environment but injury to the   la in tiff.^ 
Both alone and in the context of the full opinion, this sentence exposes 
fundamental incoherencies within standing doctrine, especially with re- 
spect to standing's relationship with environmental law. This Article ar- 
gues that the opposition the sentence creates-injury to the plaintiff ver- 
sus harm to the environment-is both nonsensical and entirely ancillary 
to the language and purpose of the statute Laidlaw supposedly interprets. 
Declaiming that injury to the plaintiff rather than harm to the environ- 
ment comprises the requisite for standing enables the Court to ground its 
basis for standing in an opposition that makes no sense, even though it is 
firmly grounded in p r e ~ e d e n t . ~  In other words, the sentence (and, conse- 
quently, the rest of the opinion) is simultaneously legally strong and 
rhetorically incoherent. 
The path to an intelligible standing doctrine does not lie in such 
fruitless comparisons. It lies instead in acknowledging statutory viola- 
tions as injurious to the social and legal system of which we all form a 
part.4 Assuming the violated statute contains a citizen suit provision, the 
resulting harm to the system could and should enable individuals to sue. 
This policy would relieve the Supreme Court of having to constantly re- 
tool its definition of cognizable legal injury. It would also conform the 
Court's standing jurisprudence to the language and intent of the statutes 
before it. Under the current regime, the statutory language often factors 
very little in the Court's analysis. 
Even though its holding enhances citizen suit standing, Luidlaw never- 
theless continues a trend wherein the environment is consistently margi- 
nalized within environmental jurispr~dence.~ Using examples drawn both 
from history (the Trail Smelter Arbitration (1930-41)) and fiction (Bar- 
bara Kingsolver's novel Animal Dreams), this Article attempts to situate 
Laidlaw within the context of the larger issue of a growing incoherence 
that is undermining the rhetoric of environmental protection. 
Laidlaw also highlights structural problems within the larger legal 
system-problems that date at least from the time of Galileo's trial in the 
*Id.  at 181. 
3See Luidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 183 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 
(1972)); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992). 
See infra Part 1V.A. 
Many commentators view Laidlaw as an unalloyed positive because of its relaxed 
standing requirements. See, e.g., RICHARD J .  PIERCE, JR. ,  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
1140 (4th ed. 2002); Jeffrey G. Miller & Chris Hilton, The Standing of Citizens to Enforce 
Against Violations of Environmental Statutes in the United States, 12 J .  ENVTL. L. 370, 
379 (2000) (noting that Laidlaw "treats citizen suits as a valued and legitimate form of 
litigation . . . [which] sends positive signals to lower courts about the value of citizen suits 
. . . ."). My own view is more tempered. I see the decision as a triage rather than a lasting 
cure. 
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seventeenth century. Galileo was accused of defying the Church's prohi- 
bition against defending and teaching Copernicus's theory that the earth 
revolved around a stable sun, rather than vice-versa. By maintaining that 
canonical law was not objective truth and that the sun did not revolve 
around the earth, Galileo forever undermined the law's a ~ t h o r i t y . ~  His 
subsequent trial precipitated the downfall of the notion of law as objec- 
tive and immutable, replacing it with the equally problematic notion of 
an objective and immutable science. Though the idea of an objective sci- 
ence has also fallen into disfavor in recent years,' it retains great cur- 
rency, particularly within jurisprudence. Often the law aligns itself with 
science, effectively cloaking itself with the mantle of ob j ec t i~ i t y .~  I call 
this phenomenon a "Galileo Problem" and take it up at greater length in 
Part V. Galileo Problems arise from attempts to manufacture permanent 
and unwavering truths from words that can at best express the historically 
or analytically contingent products of human thought and language. In 
Laidlaw, a Galileo Problem manifests when the concept of harm is 
treated as an objectively ascertainable fact and parleyed into a norm and 
then into law. 
Norms are language-based, their existence a product of communica- 
tion among the members of the social system. That the law is formed of 
words is hardly news. But when those words are contingent, they form a 
shaky foundation upon which to rest a lattice of norms. 
Laidlaw offers a compelling demonstration of a type of contingent 
language whose use undermines the Court's credibility, sowing the seeds 
of an environmental legitimation c r i ~ i s . ~  The rhetoric of both the majority 
6Galileo also argued that his views (based on the theories of ~ o ~ e r n i c b s )  did not 
conflict with the teachings of the Church. It bears noting that the geocentric theory of the 
universe (i.e., that the sun revolved around the earth) was based as much on the teachings 
of Ptolemy and Aristotle as on any scriptural authority. Once given the imprimatur of the 
Church, however, the theory rose above scrutiny. See generally JEROME J. LANGFORD, 
GALILEO, SCIENCE A N D  THE CHURCH (1992). 
' S e e ,  e.g.,  STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE RETURN TO COSMOLOGY: POSTMODERN SCIENCE 
AND THE THEOLOGY OF NATURE 255 (1982) ("[Tlhe pure scientist's traditional posture as 
. . . spectator, can no longer be maintained: we are always-and inescapably-participants 
or agents as well."); CAROLYN MERCHANT, ECOLOGICAL REVOLUTIONS: NATURE, GENDER, 
A N D  SCIENCE I N  NEW ENGLAND 4 (1989) ("Science is an ongoing negotiation with non- 
human nature for what counts as reality."); EVELYN FOX KELLER, SECRETS OF LIFE, SE- 
CRETS OF DEATH: ESSAYS ON LANGUAGE, GENDER AND SCIENCE 74 (1992): 
[Tlhe standard response to so-called relativist arguments has been that . . . sci- 
entific stories are different . . . for the simple reason that they "work" . . . As rou- 
tinely as the effectiveness of science is invoked, equally routine is the failure to 
go on to say what it is that science works at, to note that "working" is a necessary 
but not sufficient constraint. 
See MICHEL SERRES, THE NATURAL CONTRACT 86 (1995) (noting that we live now in 
a world where science alone is believed and "where only its courts judge in a doubly com- 
petent way, uniting law and non-law"). 
See JURGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 68 (1975). Legitimation crises inevi- 
tably occur when people no longer trust in the certitude of a central authority. See id. at 
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and dissenting opinions reveals fundamental misapprehensions about the 
role of language within the law, and of the language of law as it relates to 
standing and the environment. Consequently, the case brings into stark 
relief a number of the most vexing aspects of standing doctrine's incom- 
patibility with environmental jurisprudence. 
My discussion of the Laidlaw opinion requires several detours that 
frame the parts of this Article. Part I1 examines the evolution of standing 
doctrine and situates it with respect to environmental law in general and 
the Laidlaw decision in particular. Part I11 examines the convoluted result 
for standing doctrine of the distinction between injury to individuals and 
harm to environment. Part IV offers an overview of systems theory, the 
critical apparatus through which I approach the discussion. It uses the 
Trail Smelter Arbitration and Animal Dreams to illustrate the implica- 
tions of the issues raised by the case. The Trail Smelter Arbitration offers 
a real-life example of the consequences of contingent language. Animal 
Dreams underscores the dangers inherent in such language, demonstrat- 
ing that the problem does not lie in a given set of circumstances, but 
rather with the larger phenomenon of linguistic uncertainty, a character- 
istic that is equally present in fact and fiction. Part V suggests a possible 
means of egress-predicated in systems theory-from the rhetorical mo- 
rass created by the Court's standing doctrine and by modern environ- 
mental jurisprudence. It applies this new framework to Laidlaw, and then 
attempts to show how the rhetorical basis for a new, more effective sys- 
tem of environmental laws already exists to some degree in the language 
of statutes like the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA").'O 
The purpose of this Article is not simply to empty my quiver into the 
hail of arrows already directed at standing doctrine." It rather seeks to 
point out how standing is both symptom and cause of a larger incoher- 
ence that undermines our national understanding of, and commitment to, 
environmental protection. This incoherence can be resolved, I argue, by 
abandoning the convoluted and impractical doctrine of standing and 
cleaving instead to a standard of injury derived from the statutes them- 
selves, a standard measured by whether the injury alleged negatively af- 
74-75 ("A legitimation crisis . . . must be based on a motivation crisis-that is, a discrep- 
ancy between the need for motives declared by the state . . . and the motivation supplied by 
the socio-cultural system on the other."). 
lo  42 U.S.C. $3  4321-4370 (2000). 
I '  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 
UCLA L. REV. 1333 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Standing for Animals]; Cass R. Sun- 
stein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article 111, 91 M I C H .  
L. REV. 163 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?]; Gary L. Fran- 
cione, Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, 48 RUTCERS L. REV. 397 (1996); William A. 
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of 
Justiciabilify, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence on Lyons, 
59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984); Joseph L. Sax, Standing to Sue: A Critical Review of the Min- 
eral King Decision, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J.  76 (1973); Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees 
Have Standing?-Toward h g a l  Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972). 
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fects the well-being, longevity and self-reproductive capacity of the so- 
cial system. 
The social system is the web of communication and shared expecta- 
tions that enable human interaction.I2 These expectations are codified as 
norms and enacted into law.I3 Laws offer concrete articulations of the 
normative standards that enable the social system to function smoothly.14 
Deviation from those standards can create injury, not necessarily to indi- 
viduals, but to the system's ability to function and self-reproduce. That 
injury to the system-rather than to individuals-should determine the 
viability of citizen suits. 
This method of measuring harm is essentially identical to that of stat- 
utes that do not contain a private right of action, and its logic is simple and 
compelling. Both citizen suits and government enforcement actions are 
statutory creations, and both seek the same goal--observance of the law. 
Adhering to a standard that was broadly applicable to both types of ac- 
tion-instead of relying on a scattershot standing doctrine-would provide 
some welcome clarity to the chaotic world of environmental juri~prudence.'~ 
A. Article III and the Evolution of Standing 
Article I11 of the Constitution limits the judicial branch's power of 
decision to cases or controversies.16 From these constitutional limits, the 
Court fashioned standing doctrine, a doctrine designed to ensure that the 
litigating parties are truly adverse and have personal stakes in the out- 
come," as well as to preserve the separation of p ~ w e r s . ' ~  Over time, this 
commitment to codifying and safeguarding the constitutional role of the 
judicial branch has evolved into a set of rules described by the Court in 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State, Inc. : 
l2 See NIKLAS LUHMANN, ECOLOGICAL COMMUNICATION 7 (1989) ('"[S]ociety' signifies 
the all-encompassing social system of mutually referring communications. It originates 
through communicative acts alone and differentiates itself from an environment of other 
kinds of systems through the continual reproduction of communication by communication."). 
l 3  See NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW ix (Martin Albrow ed., 
Elizabeth King & Martin Albrow trans., 1985). 
l4 See Paul H .  Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utiliry of Deserr, 91 Nw. U.L. REV. 
453, 473 (1997) ("The law is . . . a vehicle by which the community debates, tests, and 
ultimately settles upon and expresses its norms."). 
l5 This approach to standing is equally applicable to non-environmental cases. Under 
this framework, the unworkable "injury-in-fact" test would be replaced by a statute-based 
determination of injury. Much of the Court's current need for unwieldy injury analysis 
would be eliminated without running afoul of the requirements of Article 111. 
l6 See U.S. CONST. art. 111, 5 2. 
l7 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). 
See id. at 96-97; Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) ("[Tlhe law of Article 
I11 standing is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers."). 
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Art. I11 requires the party who invokes the court's authority to 
"show that he personally has suffered some actual legal or threat- 
ened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the 
defendant," and that the injury "fairly can be traced to the chal- 
lenged action" and "is likely to be redressed by a favorable de- 
c i~ ion ." '~  
Courts commonly summarize the Valley Forge criteria as injury-in-fact, 
causation, and r ed re s~ab i l i t y .~~  Together, these requirements form what 
the Supreme Court calls the "irreducible constitutional minimum of stand- 
ing."2' In addition, as in Laidlaw, an association or organization may sue 
on behalf of its members when its members would have standing in their 
own right, the interests at stake are germane to the purposes of the group, 
and neither the claim nor the relief requested requires the participation of 
the individual members.22 
While these requirements appear straightforward, they are surpris- 
ingly opaque, and their relationship to the case or controversy requirement 
of Article I11 has come under increasing scrutiny. Over the approximately 
eighty years since the Court began crafting its criteria for standing,23 it 
has contorted both language and precedent in an ongoing and futile at- 
tempt to divorce the concept of standing from the substantive issues of 
law within the cause of action. 
The structural problems within standing law are well documented. 
One commentator, noting that the doctrine has been called everything from 
"incoherent" to "permeated with sophistry," concludes that its intellectual 
structure is "ill-matched to the task it is asked to perform."24 Another 
calls the doctrine "one of the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire 
domain of public law,"25 while still another labels standing's injury-in- 
fact requirement "a large scale conceptual mistake."26 
19454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (citations omitted). 
20See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1998). 
21 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). 
22 See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 
23 See Mass. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) ("The party who invokes the power 
must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is im- 
mediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and 
not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally."); see 
also Fletcher, supra note 1 1, at 225-26 (noting that modern standing doctrine (i.e., injury- 
in-fact, causation, and redressability) began to take shape in the 1930s). 
24 Fletcher, supra note 11, at 221; cf: David P. Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 
1981 SUP. CT. REV. 41,42 (1982). 
25F la~ t  v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (quoting Hearings on S. 2097 Before the 
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 
465, 498 n.6 (1966) (statement of Prof. Paul A. Freund)). 
26 See Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 1 1, at 167. 
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B. Standing and Environment-An Uneasy Marriage 
Citizen suits create some of standing's thorniest dilemmas. They oc- 
cur when a statute provides a private right of action for its enfor~ement.~' 
According to Judge Skelly Wright, the citizen suit provides a method of 
ensuring that "important legislative purposes heralded in the halls of 
Congress are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal 
bureaucra~y."~~ Because citizen suits are filed in the public interest, their 
successful prosecution normally results in fines paid to the government 
rather than to the  plaintiff^.^^ Citizen plaintiffs benefit from the imposi- 
tion of any injunctive relief as well as from the deterrent power of the 
suit against future  violation^.^^ While such suits have proved to be potent 
weapons in the enforcement arsenal, they are not always possible. A pro- 
vision enabling them must be written into the relevant law. Federal envi- 
ronmental statutes often contain such provisions and the Clean Water Act 
is no e~cept ion .~ '  
The critical sentence from L a i d l ~ w ~ ~  purportedly describes the type 
of injury required for standing to file a citizen suit under the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act (hereinafter "Clean Water Act," "CWA," or 
Yet, the citizen suit provision of the Act makes no mention of 
injury. It states simply that a citizen whose interests are or may be ad- 
versely affected may file suit if a prospective defendant is "in violation of 
an . . . effluent standard or l imi ta t i~n . "~~  
27 The relevant provision of the Clean Water Act, for example, authorizes federal dis- 
trict courts to entertain suits brought by "a person or persons having an interest which is or 
may be adversely affected." 33 U.S.C. $ 1365(a),(g) (2000). 
28Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 
1109, 1 I 1  1 (D.C. Cir. 1971). (Then) Judge Scalia took issue with Skelly Wright's com- 
ment, observing that one aim of limiting standing is to ensure that some actions are "lost 
or misdirected within the federal bureaucracy. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of 
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 88 1, 
897 (1983); see also Jonathan H .  Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and 
Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 39, 44 11.28 (2001) (noting 
same). 
29 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 106-07, (1998); Atl. States 
Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1131 n.5 (I lth Cir. 1990). 
30 See Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) ("We have recognized on numerous occa- 
sions that 'all civil penalties have some deterrent effect' . . . .") (citing Hudson v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 93, 102 (1997)). 
See 33 U.S.C. $ 1365(a). A number of other environmental statutes include citizen 
suit provisions. See 42 U.S.C. $ 9659(a) (2000) (Comprehensive Environmental Response 
and Compensation and Liability Act); 16 U.S.C. $ 1540(g) (2000) (Endangered Species 
Act); 42 U.S.C. $ 7604 (2000) (Clean Air Act); 15 U.S.C. 9 2619 (2000) (Toxic Sub- 
stances Control Act); 30 U.S.C. $ 1270 (2000) (Surface Mining Reclamation and Control 
Act); 42 U.S.C. $ 1449 (2000) (Safe Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. $ 6972 (2000) (Solid 
Waste Disposal Act). The one major environmental statute without a citizen suit provision 
is the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. $ 136 (1994). 
32 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
33 U.S.C. $9 1251-1387 (2000). 
ul Id. 9 l365(a)(l). 
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Having one's interests adversely affected is not the same as suffering 
an While one's interests and oneself may overlap, they are not 
identical. Interests are inherently subjective and not necessarily bounded 
by geography or even logic. I have never visited the Tongass Forest in 
Alaska, for example, nor do I have any plans to do so. Nevertheless, I am 
deeply interested in its preservation. If a logging concern in the Tongass 
were to discharge effluents in excess of its permitted maximum, my in- 
terests would be adversely affected. 
The language of the Clean Water Act's citizen suit provision (as well 
as its legislative history) suggests that I should be able to sue. The Court, 
however, has repeatedly held otherwise, finding that prospective plaintiffs 
must allege a cognizable injury-in-fact in order to file suit. This require- 
ment holds true irrespective of the statute's purpose or the wording of its 
citizen suit provision.36 That injury must be shown through, at a mini- 
mum, the defendant's behavior adversely impacting either the plaintiff's 
current use of an area or the plaintiff's specific plans to do so.37 Conse- 
quently, there is a disjuncture between the Court's requirements for legal 
injury and the language of the Act, which requires only a violation and 
an interested plaintiff. 
This disjuncture stems from the ancillary role of injury to the en- 
forcement of the statute as written. The Clean Water Act's drafters fo- 
cused on the existence of violations, not on h a d i n j u r y  either to the en- 
vironment or to prospective plaintiffs, as the criteria for standing.38 Thus, 
the dispute in Laidlaw over the right to sue under the Clean Water Act bears 
little relation to the actual language of the statute. Instead, the Court's 
framing of the issue effectively rewrites a key provision of the law. Put- 
ting aside the disturbing separation of power implications of such be- 
havior, the Court's apparent ability to fashion its own criteria for justi- 
ciability also raises serious questions about the basis for judicial deci- 
sion-making. 
One of the principal causes of the rhetorical problems in the law is 
that the concept of harm39 to the environment is meaningless. Harm, the 
foundation of legal injury, derives from traditional property interests. 
With ownership comes the accompanying notion that one's property 
should be protected from damage or trespass by others. By contrast, the 
environment is a type of commons: no one owns it. It is made up of "the 
surrounding conditions, influences, or forces, which influence or modify" 
35 See infra Part 1II.B. 1. 
36 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737,755 (1984); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). 
37 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564; Luidlaw IV, 528 U.S. 167, 183-84 (2000). 
38 See infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
39 Though the Laidlaw court uses harm and injury interchangeably, whenever possible 
this Article uses injury to refer to humans and harm to refer to the nonhuman. 
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humans.40 Those circumstances vary with individual perspective and are 
not things in which one can hold an ownership i n t e r e~ t .~ '  Without an 
owner, there can be neither trespass nor a controlling point of view through 
which to assess damage. Therefore, the "environment," as such, is in- 
compatible with traditional notions of harm, as well as with the body of 
law designed to protect private property. 
Standing doctrine represents the Court's attempt to elide this incom- 
patibility. Unfortunately, its conclusion that standing for a private right of 
action to enforce environmental laws (i.e., the Clean Water Act) hinges 
on injury to the plaintiff only complicates the issue further. 
The Clean Water Act's abiding goal is to protect waterways held in 
common by the citizens of the nation.42 Its citizen suit provision allows 
for a private right of action when pollutants are discharged into those 
waterways. It is hard to see how injury to individual plaintiffs fits into 
this regulatory framework, or why it should.43 Requiring injury to plain- 
tiffs as a prerequisite for standing amounts to inserting an extra-statutory 
provision into the Act, and allows the Court to conform its environmental 
rulings to private property-based doctrines as well as to the exigencies of 
the federal docket. In this respect, even while invoking Article 111, the 
Court appears to be imposing a prudential standing requirement both as a 
rationale and as a means for overriding the statute's instructions. 
Prudential standing stems from courts implementing "'prudential' 
factors, not by virtue of their inherent authority to expand or constrict 
standing, but rather as a set of presumptions derived from common-law 
tradition designed to determine whether a legal right exists."44 Issues 
giving rise to prudential standing concerns include, for example, whether 
the alleged injury is specific to the plaintiff or a widely shared social griev- 
and whether a particular plaintiff may properly assert the rights of 
a third party.46 
WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 856 (2d ed. 1939) 
41 Paul Wapner describes nature (which he uses interchangeably with environment) as 
"not a single realm with a universalized meaning, but a canvas on which we project our 
sensibilities, our culture, and our ideas about what is socially necessary." Paul Wapner, 
Leftist Criticism of "Nature": Environmental Protection in a Postmodern Age, DISSENT 
MAG., Winter 2003, at 71, available at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/articles/ 
wi03/wapnechtm. 
42 See 33 U.S.C. 5 125 1(a) (2000). 
43 See Sunstein, Whar's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 1 1, at 209-23. 
Scalia, supra note 28, at 886. 
45 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see also 
Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 394-403 (1987) (discussing the "zone of inter- 
est" requirement as an additional prudential principle necessitating that it be reasonably 
foreseeable that the plaintiff would benefit from the legislation); Air Courier Conference of 
Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 523-31 (1991) (applying Clarke to deny 
standing when the benefit to the plaintiff from the statute was fortuitous). 
46 See, e.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75; Warth, 422 U.S. at 499; Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
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Normally, courts invoke prudential standing to determine whether 
plaintiffs have a cause of action in the absence of a clear statutory direc- 
The problem with doing so here is that there is a clear statutory 
directive. The Act's language is lucid and unequivocal. When an entity 
violates the statute's effluent standards or limitations, interested (not in- 
jured) citizens may sue. Yet statutory citizen suit provisions do not easily 
conform to the Court's private property-based methods for measuring 
harm and thereby defining cases and controversies. The resulting tension 
between Congress's willingness to confer a private right of action to en- 
force environmental statutes and the Court's unwillingness to recognize 
the scope of that conferral has created a jurisprudence that is confused, 
confusing, and potentially detrimental to the national trust. 
A. Facts 
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. ("Laidlaw") purchased 
a commercial wastewater treatment plant in South Carolina. The South 
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control ("DHEC") is- 
sued Laidlaw a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
("NPDES") permit under the Clean Water authorizing the discharge 
of limited amounts of pollutants, including mercury, into the North Tyger 
River.49 Laidlaw's subsequent effluent discharges of numerous pollutants, 
especially mercury, repeatedly exceeded permissible amounts.50 
In April 1992, Friends of the Earth and Citizens Local Environ- 
mental Action Network, Inc. (hereinafter referred to, along with the Si- 
erra Club which joined the action at a later date, as "Friends of the Earth" 
or "FOE") notified Laidlaw of their intent to sue under the Clean Water 
Act immediately upon the expiration of a mandatory sixty-day waiting 
p e r i ~ d . ~ '  Following this notification, Laidlaw invited the DHEC to file suit 
against it.52 The DHEC acquiesced and Laidlaw's attorney then drafted 
the complaint and paid the filing fee.53 On the final day of the sixty-day 
waiting period, Laidlaw and the DHEC reached a settlement wherein Laid- 
law paid $100,000 in civil penalties and agreed to "make every effort" to 
comply with its permit  obligation^.^^ 
47 See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 252. 
48 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2000). 
49 See Luidlaw IV, 528 U.S. 167, 176 (2000). 
50See Luidlaw 11, 956 F. Supp. 588, 600, 613-21 (D.S.C. 1997) (noting that Laidlaw 
violated the mercury limits of the permit 489 times between 1987 and 1995). 
5 1  See Luidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 176; 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(A) (2000). 
52 See Laidlaw IV. 528 U.S. at 176. 
53 See id. at 176-77. 
54 See id. at I77 (citing Luidlaw I, 890 F. Supp. 470, 479-81 (D.S.C. 1995)). 
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By inviting the DHEC to file suit and then reaching a quick settle- 
ment, Laidlaw sought to abrogate FOE's ability to sue. The Clean Water 
Act precludes citizen suits alleging violations that have already been the 
subject of a state enforcement action.55 In June 1992, FOE filed suit any- 
way, alleging that Laidlaw was committing ongoing violations and that 
the DHEC enforcement action had not been "diligently prosecuted" in 
the manner required by the Act.56 The group sought injunctive and de- 
claratory relief.57 In asserting its standing, several members of FOE 
claimed that they had been injured because they no longer used the river 
for fishing, camping, swimming, or canoeing due to fears of the river's 
pollution and an aversion to its smell and a p p e a r a n ~ e . ~ ~  Local homeown- 
ers testified that the pollution had decreased the value of their property, 
while other witnesses stated that the pollution had caused them to aban- 
don their plans to purchase homes near the river.59 After the suit was filed 
but prior to judgment, Laidlaw violated its discharge permit thirteen 
. more times and committed an additional thirteen monitoring and ten re- 
porting ~iolations.~' 
In a nuanced holding, the district court found for the plaintiffs but 
deliberately did not predicate its holding on any finding of damage to the 
river.61 Indeed, the court found that the river had suffered no ecological 
harm from Laidlaw's d i s ~ h a r g e s . ~ ~  Nevertheless, it imposed a civil pen- 
alty of $405,800 and awarded attorneys' fees to FOE, while declining to 
award injunctive or declaratory relief.'j3 In explaining its decision not to 
award equitable relief, the court observed that the combined deterrent 
effect of the penalty and fee award should serve to forestall future viola- 
tions. In addition, the court noted that injunctive relief would serve little 
purpose since Laidlaw had recently come into substantial compliance 
with its permit  obligation^.^^ 
FOE appealed as to the amount of the judgment but did not challenge 
the denial of declaratory or injunctive relief.65 Laidlaw cross-appealed, ar- 
guing that FOE lacked standing and that the DHEC's enforcement action 
55 Laidlaw I, 890 F. Supp. at 478 (noting that Laidlaw's intent in soliciting the suit by 
DHEC was to bar FOE's proposed citizen suit); see 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(B). 
56See 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(B) (precluding citizen suits under the Clean Water Act 
when "the State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil . . . action in a court 
of the . . . State to require compliance"). 
57 See Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 167. 
58 See id. at 182-83. 
59 See id. at 182. 
See id. at 178. 
See Laidlaw 11,956 F. Supp. 588,601-03 (D.S.C. 1997). 
62 See id. at 602 ("[Tlhe . . . permit violations at issue in this citizen suit did not result 
in any health risk or environmental harm."). 
Id. at 603-1 1 .  
@See id. at 61 I .  
65 See Laidlaw 111, 149 F.3d 303, 305-06 (4th Cir. 1998). 
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precluded the lawsuit.66 The Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment and re- 
manded with instructions to dismiss, holding, inter alia, that even as- 
suming FOE had standing, the case was moot since Laidlaw had subse- 
quently come into full compliance and because FOE had not appealed the 
denial of equitable relief.67 The absence of equitable relief meant that the 
plaintiffs had won only civil penalties and, since those penalties were 
paid to the government rather than to the plaintiffs, the court found in- 
sufficient redress to satisfy the requirements for standing.68 FOE appealed 
and the Supreme Court granted ~ e r t i o r a r i . ~ ~  
The issues before the Supreme Court included whether FOE had 
standing to bring the suit and, if so, whether the case had been mooted. 
The Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, finding that FOE had standing and 
that the case was not moot.70 As noted previously, it held that the relevant 
showing for standing involves injury to the plaintiff rather than harm to 
the en~ironment.~'  In this instance, FOE demonstrated sufficient injury 
through affidavits and testimony showing that Laidlaw's discharges ad- 
versely impacted affiants' recreational, aesthetic, and economic inter- 
e s t ~ . ~ ~ T h e  injuries alleged were sufficiently concrete and particularized to 
satisfy the requirements set forth in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federa- 
t i ~ n ~ ~  a d Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.74 In addition, the deterrent effect 
provided by the civil penalties constituted sufficient redress.75 
The Court further held that the case was not moot because voluntary 
cessation of a challenged practice does not generally deprive a court of 
its ability to rule on the legality of that practice.76 Laidlaw did not meet 
its burden of showing that the challenged behavior could not reasonably 
be expected to recur.77 The district court's refusal to grant equitable relief 
did not indicate a conclusion that there was no possibility of future vio- 
lations. It showed only that, in that court's view, the civil penalties and 
66 See id. at 305. 
67 See id. at 3 0 6 4 7 .  
68 Id. 
69 See 525 U.S. 1176 (1999) (No. 98-822). 
70 Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. 167, 195 (2000). 
7 1  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
72 Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 183 (holding injury adequately alleged when plaintiffs state 
that they use the affected area and that the "'aesthetic and recreational values of the area 
will be lessened' by the challenged activity") (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 
727, 735 (1972)). 
73 497 U.S. 87 1 (1990). 
74 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
75 Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 185 ("The legislative history of the [Clean Water] Act re- 
veals that Congress wanted the district court to consider the need for retribution and deter- 
rence, in addition to restitution, when it imposed civil penalties . . . . [The district court 
may] seek to deter future violations by basing the penalty on its economic impact.") 
(quoting Tull v. U.S., 481 U.S. 412,422-23 (1987)). 
76 See id. (citing City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982)). 
77See id. (citing U.S. v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass'n., 393 U.S. 199, 203 
(1968)). 
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attorney's fees constituted a sufficient deterrent, rendering other relief 
unneces~ary.'~ 
B. Harm Under Laidlaw 
There are a number of interesting and important threads to this case, 
but this Article confines the discussion to the majority's fundamental dis- 
agreement with the dissent over what constitutes harm for purposes of 
standing. While the disagreement in Laidlaw arises with respect to the 
Clean Water Act, the issues raised are generally applicable to environ- 
mental jurisprudence. 
I do not suggest that the Court's holding itself is wrong; as Lord Mans- 
field noted, decisions are more often right than the reasons behind them.79 
Not only do I believe that the majority reached the proper conclusion 
(albeit through convoluted reasoning), I also believe the dissent's posi- 
tion to be far more pernicious to the letter and intent of the Clean Water 
Act as well as to the broader notion of environmental protection. 
Even while acknowledging the fundamental accuracy of the major- 
ity's statement that standing hinges on injury to the plaintiff rather than 
harm to the environment (a concession that is itself troubling given the 
illogic of its assertion regarding harm),80 the dissent attempts to build into 
the statute a requirement of empirical, conventionally understood injury 
to an individual plaintiff. This criterion is tellingly absent from the stat- 
ute as written8' and, if adopted, would rewrite the law to make it even 
more difficult for citizens to exercise their statutorily conferred right to 
sue. Inevitably, this would make it more unlikely that violators of the 
Clean Water Act would be prosecuted or deterred. Unfortunately, how- 
ever, the majority opinion-though properly critical of the dissent's po- 
sitions2-adds to the woes of environmental jurisprudence by muddling 
even further the already artificial boundary between environmental harm 
and individual injury. 
78 Id. at 185-86. 
79 Specifically, Lord Mansfield is reputed to have said: "Decide promptly, but never 
give any reasons. Your decisions may be right, but your reasons are sure to be wrong." 
Steven Wright, The Quotations Home Page, http://www.theotherpages.org/quote-02b.html 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2003) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 199 (Scalia, J . ,  dissenting). 
8' See Ann E.  Carlson, Standing for the Environment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 931, 960-61 
(1998) 
82 See, e.g., Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 188 n.4. 
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1 .  Laidlaw Artijcially Distinguishes Injury to Individuals from 
Harm to the Environment 
The Laidlaw majority decrees that no harm need occur to the envi- 
ronment for a citizen suit to lie.83 Consequently, a plaintiff's injuryfor 
purposes of standing under the Act need not arise from actual harm to the 
affected waterway. This is congruent with the language of the statute, which 
permits citizen suits based on violations of any conditions of NPDES 
permits, even if those violations are strictly p r o ~ e d u r a l . ~ ~  In Laidlaw, for 
example, the Court acknowledged that the entity's discharges did no cog- 
nizable harm to the river even as it found that the plaintiffs' injuries, 
which were based on a perceived harm to the river, merited standing.85 
From this we may deduce that, if an entity allegedly violates the Act, 
prospective plaintiffs need only believe that the waterway suffers harm 
and alter their behavior ac~ord ing ly .~~  That belief (along with the alleged 
violation) creates the injury that enables standing.87 
While the opinion's reasoning seems sound, the distinction it draws 
between injury to the plaintiff and harm to the environment is incoherent. 
Harm is a subjective measure of damage. Subjectivity requires a subject-an 
entity with a definable conscious perspective. Yet, the environment does not 
define itself; w e  define the environment. Depending on one's point of 
view, the concept of environment can range from the inanimate through 
an infinitely complex polyphony of  perspective^.^^ In light of this lack of 
consensus regarding what the environment is, it is understandable that 
attempts to conceive of a judicial framework wherein the environment 
83See id. at 181. 
&lSee 33 U.S.C. 8 1365(f)(6) (2000) (allowing citizen suits that allege violations of 
permits or conditions thereof); id. 3 1318 (outlining procedural requirements of permits); 
see also Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1151 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(noting same). . 
Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 181. 
86See id. at 181-183; Adler, supra note 28, at  56  ("The harm recognized by the Court 
was the lessening of the 'aesthetic and recreational values of the area' brought about by 
nothing more than the plaintiffs' beliefs that the repeated violation of NPDES permits had 
a significant environmental impact."). 
87 See Ecological Rights Found., 230 F.3d at 115 1 (citing Laidlaw and finding that "the 
threshold question of citizen standing under the CWA is whether an individual can show 
that she has been injured in her use of a particular area because of concerns about viola- 
tions of environmental laws, not whether the plaintiff can show there has been actual envi- 
ronmental harm"). 
88 For a useful survey of the history of ecology and the linked evolution of the notion 
of environment, see DONALD WORSTER, NATURE'S ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL 
IDEAS (1977). James Lovelock, architect of the Gaia Hypothesis, sees the earth as a self- 
regulating living whole, with rights that trump those of all its components (including hu- 
mans). See JAMES LOVELOCK, GAIA: A NEW LOOK AT LIFE ON EARTH 124-40 (1979); see 
also THEODORE ROSZAK, PERSONPLANET: HE CREATIVE DISINTEGRATION OF INDUS- 
TRIAL SOCIETY 32, 41, 49 (1978); Stephen R. L. Clark, Gaia and the Forms of Life, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY: A COLLECTION OF READINGS 182, 188-90 (Robert Elliot & 
Arran Gare eds., 1983). 
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could achieve legal standing have met with little success.89 Not surpris- 
ingly, given this variety of perspectives, notions of harm to the environment 
also vary greatly. For example, as we will see shortly in Animal Dreams, a 
local community's definition of harm to the environment can differ radi- 
cally from that of the management of a nearby mine. This lack of unanimity 
makes the idea of harm to the environment unintelligible as a concept 
separate and independent from the person expressing it. Therefore, the 
majority's distinction between harm to the environment and injury to the 
plaintiff falls prey to radical subjectivity, rendering it meaningless. Even 
setting aside its logical flaws, the opinion remains troubling. On a basic, 
common sense level, it seems counterintuitive to hold that injury to the 
plaintiff determines justiciability under a statute where the stated goal is 
environmental protection. Under this formulation, the environment is rele- 
gated to a subordinate role within environmental jurisprudence. The plaintiff, 
on the other hand, assumes a prominence that belies the statute's language. 
This de-emphasis of the environment is not a new development, nor 
is Laidlaw the most glaring instance of it. For the last decade or more, 
the Court's cases have consistently marginalized the environment while 
elevating the importance of the perceived woes of the humans litigating 
under environmental statutesg0 This trend occurred despite the fact that 
the stated aim of laws from the Clean Water Act through the Endangered 
Species Act9' is the protection of the e n ~ i r o n m e n t . ~ ~  
89 This is not to say that there have not been admirable attempts to do so. See, e.g., 
Stone, supra note 11, at 464-73 (arguing that the resource itself could be given standing 
with a guardian ad litem appointed to represent its interests); Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not 
to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 
1345 (1974) (suggesting that a spirit of "moral evolution" had recently spread to  include 
African Americans and women and could one day include canyons, mountains and sea- 
shores); CHRISTOPHER E. STONE, EARTH A N D  OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL PLU- 
RALISM (1987) (revising and reworking the notion of standing for trees); Sunstein, What's 
Standing After Lujan?, supra note 11,  at 232-34 (suggesting that Congress create a bounty 
for prospective environmental plaintiffs, thus enabling them to meet the injury-in-fact re- 
quirement); see also Sunstein, Standing for Animals, supra note 1 1, at 1335 (arguing that it 
is perfectly conceivable and practicable for Congress to confer standing to animals); 
RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
ETHICS 6-7 (1989) (noting the historical tradition of extending rights to oppressed minori- 
ties from the Magna Carta through the Endangered Species Act). 
90 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (noting that ac- 
quiring standing will become "substantially more difficult" if the plaintiff "is not himself 
the object of the government action or inaction he challenges"). Justice Scalia, the opin- 
ion's author, first previewed these views in an article published shortly after he was named 
to the federal bench. See Scalia, supra note 28, at 894 (asserting that standing should be 
infrequently available when "the plaintiff is complaining of an agency's unlawful failure to 
impose a requirement or prohibition upon someone else"); see also Carlson, supra note 81, 
at 935 (acknowledging the trend toward human-centered environmental jurisprudence, 
arguing for a human-centered standing requirement, and noting that a stringent injury-in- 
fact requirement will "require environmental plaintiffs to demonstrate why an environ- 
mental resource matters to real people"). 
91 16 U.S.C. $5  1531-1544 (2000). 
92 According to the declaration of goals and policy that open the Clean Water Act, "it 
is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated 
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The Court's elevation of the plaintiff at the expense of the environ- 
ment effectively turns the citizen suit provision into an extension of nui- 
sance law. Under the common law, nuisance doctrine offers remedies to 
landowners who have been injured as a result of damage to their prop- 
erty. To attain standing under the common law, landowners must demon- 
strate that the nuisance complained of is a private nuisance-that the 
damages claimed are particular to an individual or small group. By con- 
trast, only an agent of the state (or, if other criteria are met, members of a 
class action) has standing to sue to abate a "public" nuisance, wherein 
the damages involve a large number of people.93 
Rather than focus on the statute's conferral of standing to any party 
intending to enforce the Act, the Laidlaw holding seems to replace it 
with an expanded availability of standing to abate public nuisance. In- 
stead of determining whether the statute has been violated, the operative 
issue becomes whether a private plaintiff can show that she has been 
cognizably damaged. While there is arguably a place for the expansion of 
private rights of action for public nuisance, there is no legal basis for in- 
stituting it at the expense of the statute's directive. 
The Laidlaw dissent's use of the term "environmental plaintiff' im- 
plicitly highlights the tortured reasoning underlying this collision of 
standing doctrine and environmental law. The dissent (authored by Jus- 
tice Scalia and joined by Justice Thomas) states that: "[tlypically, an en- 
vironmental plaintiff . . . argues that the discharges harm the environ- 
ment, and that the harm to the environment injures him."" Under this 
formulation, the justiciability of the case hinges not on whether a defen- 
dant violated a legal duty to refrain from polluting, but rather on whether 
the defendant injured the "environmental plaintiff' serving as the envi- 
ronment's proxy. By the Court's own reasoning, a plaintiff's injury can 
exist or not exist wholly independently of any harm to the environment; 
thus it strains logic to posit that a human plaintiff's interests mirror those 
of the environment. In this context, there is no such thing as an "envi- 
ronmental plaintiff." The term is a convenient legal fiction.95 
by 1985." 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a)(l) (2000). The Endangered Species Act aims "to provide a 
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species 
depend may be conserved, [and] to provide a program for the conservation of such endan- 
gered species and threatened species . . . ." 16 U.S.C. ?j 1531(b). Virtually every major 
environmental statute contains a comparable statement of goals. 
93 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ?j 821C (1979) (noting that one must have 
either suffered a different kind of harm than others exercising the same public right, be a 
public official, or be a member of a class action in order to sue for the abatement of a pub- 
lic nuisance). 
94 Luidlaw ZV, 528 U.S. 167, 199 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
95 Professor Carlson sees this as a non-issue, arguing that a "human-centered standing 
requirement" works in the environment's favor because 
[i]f potential audiences for environmental litigants-judges, juries, members of 
the media . . .--find a closer focus on the human relationship with the resource 
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2. Judicial Standing Doctrine EfSectively Amends and Distorts 
Environmental Statutes 
The majority affirmed the existence of the plaintiffs' injury despite 
the district court's finding that the river had not been harmed by the dis- 
c h a r g e ~ . ~ ~  The injury arose because Laidlaw's mercury discharges pur- 
portedly interfered with several FOE members' ability to pursue recrea- 
tional, aesthetic, and economic interests on the river. The presence or 
absence of harm to the river did not factor into the district court's analy- 
sis of the standing eq~a t ion .~ '  Plaintiffs believed that the discharges 
harmed the river and consequently injured them as well. In essence, 
plaintiffs were injured because they believed they had been injured (a 
rhetorically powerful reflexivity). 
The dissent argues that because the district court found no harm to 
the environment and because FOE'S affidavits of injury were therefore, of 
necessity, vague, FOE lacked standing.98 In Justice Scalia's view, the 
supposed injuries arising from plaintiffs' belief that the river was polluted 
did not reach the level of "concrete and particularized" injury that the 
law requires.99 He further noted the absence of any hard data that might 
indicate decreased home values, declining recreational usage, or some 
other quantifiable injury.'"" 
The dissent grudgingly acknowledges that the assertion by the ma- 
jority that the relevant showing for standing is injury to the plaintiff 
rather than harm to the environment is "correct, as far as it goe~ ." '~ '  Nev- 
ertheless the dissent maintains that "[iln the normal course . . . a lack of 
demonstrable harm to the environment will translate, as it plainly does 
here, into a lack of demonstrable harm to citizen  plaintiff^.""'^ According 
to the dissent, "[s]ubjective apprehensions," absent any empirical evi- 
more persuasive, the recent Supreme Court standing decisions may actually im- 
prove the effectiveness of litigation as a tool for environmental protection . . . . 
Such a change in focus could, in turn, help environmental groups reach beyond 
their traditional constituencies to people who have not previously considered 
themselves environmentalists. 
Carlson, supra note 81, at 935-36. While I am skeptical that tighter standing requirements 
will win any converts to environmentalism or to the plaintiffs' side in environmental litiga- 
tion, I do believe that a greater emphasis on the human bringing the suit inevitably dimin- 
ishes the role of the environment in the suit. This in turn degrades the overall purpose of 
the statute, namely environmental protection. 
%See Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 181 (quoting Laidlaw 11, 956 F. Supp. 588, 602-03 
(D.S.C. 1997) ("All available data . . . fail to show that Laidlaw's actual discharges have 
resulted in harm to the North Tyger River."). 
97 See Laidlaw 11, 956 F. Supp. at 600 (noting that the "overall quality of the river ex- 
ceeds levels necessary to support . . . recreation"). 
98 See Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 198-201 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
"See id. at 198 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
'"See Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 199-200 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
lo' Id. at 199. 
Iu2 Id. 
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dence, are legally insufficient and "accepting them even in the face of a 
finding that the environment was not demonstrably harmed . . . makes the 
injury-in-fact requirement a sham."'03 In other words, the dissent argues, 
though harm to the environment is not required by the law, courts should 
require it nonetheless.lW 
If it had been adopted, this formulation would have effectively writ- 
ten a new provision into the Clean Water Act. Such action is necessary, 
the dissent contends, in order to keep standing doctrine from devolving 
into farce.Io5 The Court's failure to adopt this position means that, "if there 
are permit violations, and a member of a plaintiff environmental organi- 
zation lives near the offending plant, it,would be difficult not to satisfy 
today's lenient standard."Io6 In the dissent's view, this is a dangerously 
expansive precedent, even though it amounts to no more than the statute's 
language explicitly allows, and is considerably less expansive than what 
the statute's drafters intended.lo7 
Io3 Id. at 20 1. 
IM Indeed, as discussed in supra text accompanying note 36, the statute requires nei- 
ther a showing of harm to the environment nor harm to the plaintiff. See 33 U.S.C. 
9 1365(a)(l) (2000): 
[Alny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf- 
( I )  against any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent 
standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Adminis- 
trator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or 
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Adminis- 
trator to perform any act or duty under this chapter. . . . 
See also Karl S. Coplan, Refracting the Spectrum of Clean Water Act Standing in Light of 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 169 (1997): 
[Tlhe Congress [in enacting the Clean Water Act] adopted a blanket prohibition on 
all discharges of pollutants, whether or not the discharge caused any dernonstra- 
ble harm to the receiving water body, except and unless the discharge was authorized 
by (and in compliance with) a permit issued in accordance with its provisions. 
Id. at 174 (emphasis added). 
Io5 See Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 201 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
lC6 Id. 
'07 See ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DIV. OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF 
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 9 3 ~ ~  CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLU- 
TION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 221 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter LEGISLA- 
TIVE HISTORY]. Senator Muskie stated that under the citizen suit provision as drafted 
I would presume that a citizen of the United States, regardless of residence, would 
have an interest as defined in this bill regardless of the location of the waterway 
and regardless of the issue involved. 
Id. 
Senator Bayh then commented: 
[Tlhe conference provision will not prevent any person or group with a legitimate 
concern about water quality from bringing suit against those who violate the act 
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Though flawed, the dissent nevertheless raises crucial problems with 
the majority's reasoning. For example, it correctly points out that the in- 
jury-in-fact requirement of standing doctrine is a sham. It bears noting, 
however, that Laidlaw did not make this so. In actuality, the Laidlaw 
majority's conclusion that belief rather than actual injury is all that is 
required for standing merely validates what Judge William Fletcher has 
long argued-that a genuine belief in an injury having occurred com- 
prises actual injury, and that to claim otherwise is to attach external nor- 
mative requirements to an ostensibly factual inquiry.los Consequently, the 
voluminous prose that the Court has produced as part of its ongoing ef- 
forts to codify the concept of factual injury has only served to obfuscate 
an inherently unworkable notion.lW 
C.  Injury to the Plaintiff-The Implications of a Judge-Made Law 
The Laidlaw majority appears to recognize that its holding effec- 
tively amends the Clean Water Act, and purposely mitigates the impact of 
this amendment by relaxing the requirements for a showing of harm. Its 
finding that a belief in an injury's having occurred is equivalent to an 
actual injury expands the definition of injury to the point of irrelevance. 
Assuming a plaintiff is not lying, belief in an injury is always an actual 
injury.l1° Yet, even as it tempers the impact of its judge-made amendment 
or  a permit, or against the Administrator if he fails to perform a non discretionary 
act. 
Id. 
Io8 See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 231 ("[Tlhe 'injury in fact' requirement cannot be 
applied in a non-normative way."); Sunstein, Standing for Animals, supra note 11, at 1352 
("[It is important] to recognize that the legal system is denying thzt people suffer injury in 
fact for reasons that involve not facts but judgments about what facts, and what harms, 
ought to count for legal purposes."). 
I w  The Court itself has acknowledged that its rulings on standing have been less than 
clear. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464,475 (1982): 
We need not mince words when we say that the concept of "Art. 111 standing" has 
not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases decided by 
this Court . . . nor when we say that this very fact is probably proof that the con- 
cept cannot be reduced to a one-sentence or one-paragraph definition. 
See also Fletcher, supra note 11 (reviewing the lack of clarity in standing jurisprudence); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 
(1988) (discussing the development of standing doctrine); Fallon, supra note 11 (noting 
that the Court's standing doctrine is particularly problematic with respect to public law 
litigation). 
"Osee Fletcher, supra note 11, at 231 ("There cannot be a merely factual determina- 
tion whether a plaintiff has been injured except in the relatively trivial sense of determin- 
ing whether plaintiff is telling the truth about her sense of injury."); Sunstein, Standing for 
Animals, supra note 11, at 1352 ("[Tlhe legal system is denying that people suffer injury in 
fact for reasons that involve not facts but judgments about what facts, and what harms, 
ought to count for legal purposes."). 
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to the statute, the Court undermines the Act's substantive language. If a 
plaintiff must show injury to herself in o r d e ~  to enforce a statute designed 
to protect the nation's waterways, then there exists a fundamental discon- 
nect between the statute's purpose and the Court's interpretation of it.Ii1 
Laidlaw is by no means an isolated example of this phenomenon. 
The Court has faced similar dilemmas on numerous other occasions. In 
Sierra Club v. M o r t ~ n , " ~  for example, the Sierra Club sought to enjoin 
the Walt Disney Corporation from developing a ski resort in a section of 
the Sequoia National Forest that lay adjacent to Sequoia National Park. 
The complaint alleged that the development "would destroy or otherwise 
adversely affect the scenery, natural and historic objects and wildlife of 
the park and would impair the enjoyment of the park for future genera- 
t i o n ~ " " ~  and that the Club was therefore entitled to standing under Sec- 
tion 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").114 While acknowl- 
edging that such allegations can theoretically comprise legal injury, the 
Court nevertheless denied standing on the grounds that the Sierra Club 
had neither claimed economic injury"5 nor had any of its members al- 
leged that they would be otherwise affected by the development.Ii6 
Morton merits attention here not because the holding was necessar- 
ily wrong, but rather because it offers one of the first and best examples 
of the Court defining legal injury in the environmental context to require 
specific and articulable injury to the plaintiff.Ii7 Sometimes, as in Morton, 
the language of the statute (in this case, the APA) suggests that injury to 
the plaintiff is necessary for standing.'I8 Other times, as with the Clean 
Water Act and other environmental statutes, nothing in the text of the 
statute supports such an inference. 
The Clean Water Act confers standing on all "persons having an in- 
terest which is or may be adversely affe~ted.""~ Elsewhere the Act refers 
to "any interested person."120 Courts have found no discernable difference 
between these two terms. In fact, according to the D.C. Circuit, both phrases 
incorporate the injury-in-fact rule set forth in Morton.''' While a finding 
I i 1  See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
Il2405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
[ I 3  Id. at 734. 
' I 4  5 U.S.C. 99 55 1-559. 
I l 5  See Morton, 405 U.S. at 734. 
I l 6  See id. at 734-41. 
For other examples, see Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 
(1986); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study 
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce- 
dures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
) I 8  5 U.S.C. 9 702 (2000) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, 
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant stat- 
ute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.") (emphasis added). 
' I 9  33 U.S.C. 8 1365 (a),(g) (2000). 
33 U.S.C. 5 1369(b). 
Iz1  See Montgomery Envtl. Coalition v. Costle, 646 F.2d 568, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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that there is no discernable difference between these two terms is itself 
worthy of discussion, the matter becomes even more curious when one 
considers the language of Morton that the terms supposedly incorporate. 
Morton, in interpreting the APA's requirement that prospective plain- 
tiffs suffer legal wrong or be adversely affected by agency action, finds 
that the "party seeking review must allege facts showing that he is him- 
self adversely affected."lZ2 In contrast, the Clean Water Act's citizen suit 
provision requires only an allegation that one's interests were adversely 
affected. The difference in the language of the two statutes involves more 
than mere semantics; there is an important distinction between one's in- 
terests and oneself. Yet, even though the plain meaning of the statutes' 
wording should control,123 these discrete concepts of interest and self- 
hood are lumped together under a general requirement that an "environ- 
mental plaintiff' must allege injury to herself. This seems simply wrong. 
The Morton Court went out of its way to note that in order to merit 
standing, an affected interest must rise to the level of injury1"-but also 
acknowledged that not every negatively affected interest amounts to an 
injury.Iz5 Rather, an affected interest becomes an injury when the threat to 
that interest is "actual and imminent."lZ6 Those criteria are met, for ex- 
ample, when a plaintiff demonstrates concrete plans to visit the area 
where the proposed violation is occurring.12' Even when they do not rise 
to the level of injury, the Court recognized that affected interests can and 
do exist.128 
Thus, under the Court's reasoning, having one's interests detrimen- 
tally affected can-but need not-amount to an injury to oneself. It follows 
that while one's interests and oneself overlap, they are not one and the same. 
The Clean Water Act grants standing to prospective plaintiffs whose 
interests are affected; there is nothing in its language to suggest that those 
affected interests must have metamorphosed into an injury.Iz9 Neverthe- 
Iz2 405 U.S. at 740. 
I2'See, e.g., Smith v. U.S., 508 U.S. 223,228 (1993) ("When a word is not defined by 
statute, we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning."). 
lZ4 See 405 U.S. at 738 ("[Blroadening the categories of injury that may be alleged in 
support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement that the party 
seeking review must himself have suffered an injury."). 
IZ5 Id. at 738-39 (noting that mere interest in a problem is not sufficient to render an 
individual or organization sufficiently aggrieved to merit standing). 
lZ6 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) ("[Ilntentions-with- 
out any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some 
day will be--do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases 
require."). 
lz7 See id. 
lZ8 See id. at 563 (1992) (demanding that plaintiffs must show they would be injured by 
defendant's action over and above demonstrating a "special interest" in the subject). 
lZ9 While there is some discussion in the legislative history averring that the Clean 
Water Act's citizen suit provision is based on Section 10 of the APA and the Morton 
Court's interpretation thereof, see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 107, at 249-50 (re- 
marks of Congressman Dingell), the statute's language does not bear this out. If the draft- 
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less, despite, clear statutory language and its own cases setting out the 
difference between interests and injuries, the Court continues to conflate 
the two. ' 
When one considers that statutory interpretation is nothing if not at- 
tentive to nuance and that a court's reading of a statute can turn on mat- 
ters as subtle as the choice of conjunction, this willingness to disregard a 
key difference in statutory phrasing seems both puzzling and at logger- 
heads with the Court's traditional jur i spr~dence . '~~ As Justice Frankfurter 
liked to say, the three cardinal rules of statutory interpretation are: "(1) Read 
the Statute; (2) read the Statute; (3) read the Statute!"13' 
Having effectively disregarded Justice Frankfurter's admonition and 
created a line of cases that require injury to the plaintiff in addition to an 
alleged statutory violation, the Court must periodically face the unenvi- 
able task of determining what type of injury to the plaintiff constitutes legal 
harm. If, for example, the sight of a river running murky makes a person 
feel unhappy, would that be legal injury for purposes of the Clean Water 
Act under the Court's definition? It would be hard to argue that the injury 
is not genuine where the plaintiff's unhappiness is heartfelt and sincere. 
But is her injury sufficient to state a cause of action? The Court's past 
precedent offers little encouragement for such a Yet, under Laid- 
ers of the Clean Water Act had meant to follow the APA, it would have been a simple 
matter to  simply incorporate its language awarding standing to any person "suffering legal 
wrong" or "adversely affected or aggrieved." 5 U.S.C. 8 701(6) (2000). Instead, the Clean 
Water Act speaks of persons whose interests (rather than their person(s)) were affected. 33 
U.S.C. 5 1369(b)(l) (2000). The legislative history also chronicles a colloquy between 
Senators Bayh and Muskie suggesting that the chosen language in the bill was meant only 
to track the Morton Court's finding that an affected interest may "reflect aesthetic, conser- 
vational and recreational as well as economic values" rather than the need for personal 
injury to a plaintiff. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 107, at 221. 
I3O See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) ("In construing a stat- 
ute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used."); De Sylva v. 
Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 572-78 (1956) (contrasting disjunctive and conjunctive readings 
of key provisions of the Copyright Act). 
13' Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in FELIX 
FRANKFURTER: T H E  JUDGE 30 ,36  (Wallace Mendelson ed., 1964). 
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (finding plain- 
tiff's claims that they had visited area and intended to do so again inadequate for standing 
because they failed to demonstrate specific concrete plans to visit the area again and thus did 
not show "actual or imminent" injury). Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), 
cited in Laidlaw IV by both the majority, see 528 U.S. at 188 n.4, and dissent, see id. at 
203-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting), offers another excellent (non-environmental) example of 
the difficulty such cases present. In Linda R. S., the mother of an out-of-wedlock child 
sued to force a Texas district attorney to enforce the state's child support laws regardless of 
the marital status of the parents. 410 U.S. at 614-15. The Court held that she lacked 
standing because there was no "direct relationship" between the alleged injury and the 
claim sought to be adjudicated. Id. at 618. Because the suit, if successful, would not result 
in the payment of child support, Linda R. S.'s injury was not cognizable. Id. Since Linda 
R. S. did not sue for child support, but rather for equal protection violations, the Court's 
ruling-rather than hinging on redressability-seems to hinge on whether equal protection 
violations fall within the zone of interest of Texas child support laws. The Court's holding 
suggests that they do not. 
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law, her injury should suffice, even if the river's murkiness did not result 
from the violation itself. As long as an entity violated the Act in some 
fashion and the plaintiff believes that the violation caused the murky 
water, then her resulting despondency would seem to constitute legal in- 
jury and her citizen suit should lie. 
While it seems unlikely that the Court would allow standing in the 
above scenario, it is not clear on what grounds standing would be denied. 
Having to consistently fashion fact-specific rules to determine whether an 
alleged injury is standing-worthy is a burden the Court has brought upon 
itself. Furthermore, insistence on injury to the plaintiff is a requirement 
of the Court's own design, a design it claims is necessary to satisfy Arti- 
cle III.133 
Article I11 requires a justiciable case or controversy, which over the 
years the Court has interpreted to mean adverse litigants with personal 
stakes in the outcome.134 The idea that this personal stake must be an "in- 
jury-in-fact" dates from the Court's 1970 decision in Ass'n of Data Proc- 
essing Service Organizations v. As Fletcher has explained, this 
requirement has served only to confuse, rather than clarify, the meaning 
of case or controversy.136 
For its part, the Clean Water Act enables the creation of discharge 
limits ostensibly to protect waterways (not plaintiffs) from harm.I3' There 
is no dispute that Laidlaw exceeded those limits. According to the district 
court, Laidlaw violated its permit no fewer than 489 times.I3* Neverthe- 
less, the court found that the river had not been harmed. While this 
finding did not derail FOE'S lawsuit (the statute does not specifically re- 
quire that a waterway be harmed for a violation to have occurred139) it did 
create a dilemma for the court. 
The Court's quandary may be summarized as follows: The Clean 
Water Act regulates the discharge of pollutants into waterways. Pollut- 
ants must be harmful or they would not be p01lutants.l~~ Yet, the Court 
133  See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979) 
("In order to satisfy Art. 111, the plaintiff must show that he personally has suffered some 
actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant. 
Otherwise the exercise of federal jurisdiction 'would be gratuitous and thus inconsistent 
with the Art. 111 limitation."') (citations omitted) (quoting Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare 
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)). 
'"See Baker v. Cam, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) ("Have the appellants alleged such a 
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure . . . concrete adverseness 
. . . ?'.). 
135 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970). 
136See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 230-34 (arguing that since anyone who honestly 
claims to be injured is in fact injured, the injury-in-fact requirement is a disguised norma- 
tive inquiry and the requirement itself is incoherent). 
I3'See 33 U.S.C. 8 1251(a) (2000) ("The objective of this chapter is to restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."). 
13* See Laidlaw 11, 956 F. Supp. 588, 613-21 (D.S.C. 1997). 
See supra note 90  and accompanying text. 
'"See infra note 209 and accompanying text. 
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simultaneously finds Laidlaw liable for the discharge of pollutants even 
as it finds that those pollutants did no harm. While it is true that the po- 
tential to cause harm can qualify a substance as a pollutant, this definition 
contains its own set of problems, as we shall shortly see. In an attempt to 
resolve the issue while yet maintaining allegiance to its tortured standing 
doctrine, the Court demands a showing of injury (however attenuated) to 
the plaintiff instead of harm to the waterway. That injury, according to 
the Court, arises from the fact that those who live near and use the river 
think that Laidlaw's discharges have harmed the river. Thus, for purposes 
of Article 111, the case or controversy stems from plaintiffs' mistaken 
perception that the river has been harmed. 
According to Laidlaw, then, even though the plant violated the CWA 
489 times, the cause of action under the Act survives only because plain- 
tiffs (mistakenly) believe that the river was harmed. As a matter of both 
law and policy, this approach seems convoluted and counterproductive. 
The statute prohibits discharges into waterways in excess of permitted 
limits. If the goal is to deter such discharges and the statute contains a 
private right of action to enable enforcement, why require plaintiffs to 
assert injuries to themselves-injuries that, under Laidlaw, may or may 
not have an empirical link to the alleged violation-in order to sue? 
The Court has yet to come to grips with the dissonance within its 
rhetoric and reasoning that this approach creates. When the Clean Water 
Act explicitly confers a private right of action in the event of its viola- 
tion, the Court's demand for a further showing of harm (whether to the 
plaintiff or to the environment) imposes an extra-statutory requirement 
cloaked in the protective rhetoric of Article 111. Perhaps more important, 
however, the Court does not define harm in either context. As a result, it 
must contort both the English language and its own precedent to find that 
injury (or harm) can exist under the Clean Water Act even when there is 
apparently no harm (or injury) to the very object that the Act was 
adopted to protect. 
IV. SYSTEMS THEORY AND HARM: A LOOK AT THE TRAIL SMELTER 
ARBITRATION AND ANIMAL DREAMS 
Even though it complicates standing doctrine, distinguishing be- 
tween injury to the plaintiff and harm to the environment nevertheless 
seems useful for clarifying the nature and severity of a claimed injury. It 
is not. Harm is subjective; one person's harm is another person's boon. In 
a nation rife with controversy over everything from roads in national for- 
ests to offshore drilling to tax cuts to genetically modified food, one need 
not look far for examples of actions that are simultaneously lauded and 
demonized by various constituencies. Unless there is a conscious entity 
from whose point of view harm can be defined, the term lacks meaning. 
Consider, for example, that among the materials the Clean Water Act 
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classifies as pollutants (which it elsewhere pledges to eliminate from the 
nation's waterways) are biological materials, heat, rock, and sand-all of 
which occur naturally in  waterway^.'^' This is less a problem with drafts- 
manship-although it may be that as well-than with the nature of the 
terminology. The subjectivity of terms like harm and pollution renders 
them indefinable, making it very difficult to legislate for their control or 
avoidance. 
Two examples illustrate this problem. The first is the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration, an international environmental arbitration between the United 
States and Canada that stretched from 1930 through 1941 The second 
comes from Barbara Kingsolver's novel, Animal Dreams, a story about a 
small town in Arizona fighting to keep its river from being poisoned and 
dammed by a local mining ~ 0 n c e r n . I ~ ~  Understanding the applicability of 
these examples as well as the workability of my proposed solution will 
require a brief discussion of the mechanics of systems theory. 
A. Systems Theory and the Legal System 
Systems theory posits that society is a conglomeration of systems-po- 
litical, legal, educational, and so forth. A system is an organization of 
components functioning as a unit to perpetuate the survival of the whole. 
Each human is a biological system comprised of many functional sub- 
systems (digestive, nervous, cardiovascular, etc.). Humans are themselves 
components of the larger social system, which in turn forms part of an 
ecosystem, and so on.'44 The social system is "functionally differentiated"- 
its sub-systems are serving specific  function^.'^^ All function systems share 
a common goal-the survival and reproduction of the larger system.'46 The 
j 4 !  33 U.S.C. 5 i362(6) (2000); see also NEIL EVERNDEN, THE SOCIAL CREATION OF 
NATURE 4-7 (1992) (discussing the "ongoing debate between the accusers and the alleged 
perpetrators about what actually constitutes pollution"). 
1 4 2  3 R.I.A.A. 1907 (1941). 
143 Both examples, particularly ANIMAL DREAMS, are treated at greater length in DAVID 
N. CASSUTO, DRIPPING DRY: LITERATURE, POLITICS, AND WATER I N  THE DESERT SOUTH- 
WEST (2001). 
I M  Luhmann offers this stark appraisal of humanity's place within the larger network 
of systems: 
It is clear . . . that "constructivism" is a completely new theory of knowledge, a 
post-humanistic one. This is not intended maliciously but only to make clear that 
the concept "man" (in the singular!), as a designation for the bearer and guarantor 
of the unity of knowledge, must be renounced. The reality of cognition is to be 
found in the current operations of the various [self-reproducing] systems. 
Niklas Luhmann, The Cognitive Program of Constructivism and a Reality that Remains 
Unknown, in SELFORGANIZATION: PORTRAIT OF A SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 78 (Wolfgang 
Krohn et al. eds., 1990). 
145 See NIKLAS LUHMANN, ESSAYS ON SELF-REFERENCE 228-29 (1990). 
)*See FRANCISCO J. VARELA, PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGICAL AUTONOMY 13 (1979) 
(defining an autopoietic system as one that is both autonomous and continually self- 
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legal system is one of many function systems within the larger social sys- 
tem. 
The legal system arises from an evolving network of shared expec- 
tations within society. It relies on the assumption that our respective ex- 
pectations of each other are reasonably congruent.I4' When these expec- 
tations are undermined, we can no longer predict how our fellow mem- 
bers of the social system will behave. Even more importantly, we can no 
longer expect the expectations others will have of When this hap- 
pens, the system's functioning is imperiled and social instability r e s ~ 1 t s . I ~ ~  
Expectations of expectations can be more colloquially expressed as a 
sense of how things "ought" to go.lS0That, in essence, is a norm-a uni- 
versally recognized expectation of the way things ought to go. While these 
expectations are not always realistic or even rational, they do enable hu- 
man interaction. They are myths that are accepted as if they were true.lS1 
Even as we acknowledge the importance of norms to socialstability, it is 
important to remember that expectations are fluid. Norms shift as the so- 
producing); see also LUHMANN, supra note 12 (adapting Varela's concept to social systems 
and arguing that when system elements are conceived of as communicative acts rather than 
bioenergetic entities, the concept of autopoiesis extends to the social domain); WILLIAM R. 
PAULSON, THE NOISE OF CULTURE: LITERARY TEXTS IN A WORLD OF INFORMATION 121- 
27 (1988). 
I4'See LUHMANN, supra note 13, at 30 ("[Clertainty in the expectation of expectations 
. . . is much more meaningful than the certainty of fulfilling expectations."). 
14* See id. at ix.: 
The expectation of expectations is a fundamental feature of stable systems of hu- 
man action, reducing an otherwise unmanageable range of alternative strategies to 
something predictable. Moreover, that expectation of expectations has to be gen- 
eralised over the greatest number of persons and alternatives for action to provide 
the necessary stability. 
149 See id. at 4 1 : 
[Tlhe social system has to supervise and channel the process of disappointments 
of expectation-and this not only to enforce effectively the right expectations 
(such as legal norms), but in order to create the possibility of counterfactual, dis- 
appointment-prepared and normative expectation in the first place. The expectant 
person must be prepared and equipped in case he arrives at a discrepant reality. 
He would otherwise not have the courage to expect normatively, and therefore 
with determination. The channeling and cooling out of disappointments is part of 
the stabilisation of structures. 
I5O See id. at 33. 
I S 1  See LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY, PERSPECTIVES ON GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY 67 
(1975). Bertalanffy discusses the suggestion of Hans Vainginger, one of the originators of 
systems theory, that such "As-If" constructions are necessary components of a functioning 
society. Even "such moral concepts as Freedom, God, Immortality, and Human Dignity are 
fictions but nevertheless of immense importance: for we have to behave 'as if' they were 
reality . . . . [Tlhe myths of tradition are fictions based on the mythical experiences of man 
and later invested in historical narratives." See also CASSUTO, supra note 143, at 123. 
Heinonline - -  28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 104 2004 
20041 Standing, Environment, and Other Contested Terms 105 
cia1 system  evolve^.'^' While the legal system relies on a certain amount 
of predictability within interaction, there must be adaptability as well. 
Though an expectation may be thwarted in a particular instance, that 
failure will not affect future expectations. This is because "ought," as a 
normative concept, contains an imbedded determination not to learn. The 
tendency to adhere to a set of beliefs despite empirical evidence to the 
contrary is wholly understandable given the nature of the social system.'53 If, 
for example, I witness someone running a red light, I do not immediately 
discard my belief that people should and will stop at red lights, nor will I 
start running them myself. My allegiance to the system's norms signifies 
my resolve not to learn from experience. Were my expectations to change 
every time someone or something deviated from the norm, those expec- 
tations would become so ephemeral as to offer no stability at all. If other 
people's expectations became similarly capricious, the normative struc- 
ture on which society depends would be critically compromised. 
Nevertheless, even as I expect everyone to stop for red lights, I know 
that not everyone will. The inevitability of disappointment is thus also 
built into the concept of expectations. Without the risk of disappoint- 
ment, expectations would become certainties, creating a world that would 
be completely predictable and free of ~on t ingency . '~~  This is impossible, 
of course; disappointments will always occur and expectations of expec- 
tations will continue despite them. Norms are therefore counterfactual- 
they often belie reality.15' Systems must retain this norm-based resistance 
to learning even as they adapt to changing realities. Herein lies one of the 
principal challenges of the legal system. It must be simultaneously both 
predictable and m ~ t a b 1 e . l ~ ~  
These characteristics-predictability and inconsistency-exist in 
delicate counterpoise; their coexistence depends on efficient communi- 
152 See LUHMANN, supra note 13, at 35. 
15)See EVERNDEN, supra note 141, at 29-30: 
[Tlhe tendency to practice the subterfuge of mythmaking is understandable. In 
practical terms, it may very well afford us some measure of comfort by legiti- 
mating a belief in the certainty of at least a few features of existence and a few 
behavioral norms. But in the long run, it solves nothing, and has the added effect 
of drastically transforming . . . nature. 
See also CASSUTO, supra note 143, at 123-24. 
lS4 See LUHMANN, supra note 13, at 33 ("[N]ormative expectations signify the deter- 
mination not to learn from disappointments. The possibility of disappointment is fore- 
seen--one knows oneself to be in a complex and contingent world . . . but is, at the outset, 
seen as irrelevant to the expectation [as opposed to cognitive expectations]."). 
See id. ("[Nlorms are counterfactually stabilised behavioural expecrarions. Their 
meaning implies unconditional validity . . . as independent of actual fulfillment o r  non- 
fulfillment.") (emphasis in original). 
156 See LUHMANN, supra note 145, at 237 ("All autopoietic systems have to live with 
an inherent improbability: that of combining closure and openness. Legal systems present 
a special version of this problem. They have to solve it by combining . . . not-leaning and 
learning dispositions."). 
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cation within the legal system. That communication is enabled by lan- 
guage. Anything with which the system can communicate is effectively 
part of the system. That with which it cannot communicate is not part of 
the system but rather forms part of the system's environment.I5' The envi- 
ronment, as a systems-theoretical construct, is akin to the conventional 
notion of environment. For the system, the environment is everything that 
is not the system. Similarly, for individuals, the environment is the total- 
ity of one's circumstances. Under either definition, the environment can 
be described as everything that is not the entity itself. 
The system's environment makes itself known to the system through 
creating  disturbance^.'^^ The moment that the disturbance becomes intel- 
ligible to the system (i.e., communication between it and the system oc- 
curs), the disturbance ceases to be part of its environment and becomes part 
of the system. In grasping how to communicate with and create meaning 
from a disturbance, the system transforms the disturbance into a known 
quantity. In terms of a map, one might picture the environment periodi- 
cally ceding territory to the system in a border skirmish and then gaining 
back other territory e1~ewhere . I~~  Thus, the communicative act is also one 
of incorporation and boundary realignment. 
We see then that the system and its environment share a dynamic 
border that shifts and flows in response to disruption. A system responds 
and adapts to environmental perturbation in a manner designed to ensure 
its survival. As the system adapts, it gains complexity, enabling it to bet- 
ter cope with future perturbations. A static environment/system relation- 
ship would mean that communication as well as systemic evolution would 
stagnate. Stability depends on the system's ability to reproduce and function 
both despite and because of ongoing environmental disturbance.IM) 
The dynamic border between the system and environment means that 
boundary drawing is ongoing, subjective and in constant flux.I6' The act 
Is7See LUHMANN, supra note 12, at 29 ("[Olne could say that the environment of the 
social system cannot communicate with society."); SERRES, supra note 8, at 85 ("Nature 
lies outside the collectivity, which is why the state of nature remains incomprehensible to 
the language invented in and by society."); CASSUTO, supra note 143, at 101 ("[Environ- 
ment] includes everything with which the system cannot communicate."). 
Is8 See LUHMANN, supra note 12, at 29. 
Is9 CASSUTO, supra note 143, at 129 n.8: 
The map analogy is not wholly accurate because the system and environment are 
not finite. Even as the system grows more complex and gains a little territory from 
the environment, so  too does the environment grow more complex and regain its 
previous size. A more accurate analogy might be a three-dimensional map with 
the system and environment sharing one border but having nothing limiting their 
expansion on any other side. 
IM Id. at 102. 
Ranulph Glanville and Francisco Varela compare the systemlenvironment distinc- 
tion to a Mobius strip where "[tlhe edges dissolve BECAUSE the fonns are themselves 
continuous-they re-enter and loop around themselves." "Your Inside is Out and Your 
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of drawing boundaries and defining environment is a self-interested act.'62 
The system will designate boundaries conducive to its potential to self- 
reproduce (i.e., perpetuate itself). Despite the inherent uncertainty of the 
process, boundary drawing is crucial to self-definition. It is also an inher- 
ently subjective process infused with ideology, and integral to the distri- 
bution of power. Thus, when political districts are redrawn, the bounda- 
ries are determined by the party in power, and when nations lose wars, 
their boundaries are redrawn by the victor. This same phenomenon holds 
true at the level of race and even of species.'63 
If environments vary with subjectivity, so too must the linked con- 
cepts of pollution and environmental protection. As Neil Evernden notes, 
pollution "involves questions not only of concentrations but also of con- 
sequence~."'~" This observation seems especially apt with respect to 
Laidlaw. The majority and dissent differ not with respect to the existence 
of pollutants in the waterways, but as to their implications. Missing from 
the analysis, however, is any discussion of the meaning of the term "pol- 
lutant." 
Pollutants do not exist outside of systems; pollution presupposes a 
system to p01lute.l~~ Identifying pollutants involves determining that a 
foreign presence and potential source of harm exists within the system.'66 
Deciding that a substance is a pollutant requires two potentially problem- 
atic steps: designating the system's boundaries and defining harm. 
In the case of the Clean Water Act, the statute was enacted to protect 
the nation's waterways from ~ontamination.'~~ The amount of mercury that 
Outside is In" (Beatles, (1968)), in 2 APPLIED SYSTEMS A N D  CYBERNETICS: PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON APPLIED SYSTEMS RESEARCH A N D  CYBERNETICS 
640 (George Lasker ed., 1981) (emphasis in original). 
I6*See IAJHMANN, srdpm note 12, at 6 ("[Slystems define their own boundaries. They 
differentiate themselves and thereby constitute the environment as whatever lies outside 
the boundary."). 
I6'Perhaps the best example of the contingency of harm and the subjectivity of 
boundaries comes from the ongoing attempt to define and refine the limits of the human, 
and, within that broader category, to designate specific types of humans. See generally 
PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT (1999); LEONARD CASSUTO, 
THE INHUMAN RACE: THE RACIAL GROTESQUE I N  AMERICAN LITERATURE A N D  CULTURE 
(1997); IAN F. HANEY-LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
(1996). See also CARY WOLFE, CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTS: POSTMODERN THEORY A N D  THE 
PRAGMATICS OF THE "OUTSIDE" 4 1 4 5  (1998); Donna Haraway, A Cyborg Manifesto: Sci- 
ence, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century, in SIMIANS, CY- 
BORGS, A N D  WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE 149 (1991); Etienne Balibar, Racism 
and Nationalism, in RACE, NATION, CLASS: AMBIGUOUS IDENTITIES 57 (Chris Turner, 
trans., 1991). 
164 EVERNDEN, supra note 141, at 4. 
165 See id. at 36. 
'66See MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF T H E  CONCEPTS OF 
POLLUTION A N D  TABOO 35-36 (2000) (discussing dirt and pollution as windows through 
which to view a system's ordering methods). Dirt, according to Douglas, is never an iso- 
lated event: "Where there is dirt there is system." Id. at 35. 
16' Specifically, the Act seeks to eliminate "the discharge of pollutants into . . . naviga- 
ble waters" and to attain a "goal of water quality which provides for the protection and 
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contaminates a waterway is directly contingent on the optimal state of the 
waterway as perceived by the system's constituents, which is a function 
of where the waterway begins and ends. The relevant boundaries would 
therefore appear to be those of the nation's waterways. Yet, far from sim- 
plifying the issue, designating boundaries raises a host of new questions. 
Does a river begin at its headwaters? If so, is the snow pack on a mountain- 
top that will eventually melt into a river part of the river? Furthermore, 
does the river end at its mouth? Would not the discharge of mercury into 
a waterway also affect the place into which the river empties? Would not 
polluting its headwaters also pollute the river? These are questions of 
perception, not of fact. 
In defining the optimal state of a waterway-a prerequisite for de- 
termining whether the waterway has been polluted-boundaries must be 
set and agreed upon. Potential pollutants impede the attainment of that 
perceived optimal state. Yet, there is no objective method for determining 
when and if contamination takes place because that determination is contin- 
gent on systemic priorities. The optimal state of a given waterway is a 
matter of fierce debate between the many constituencies that look to use 
it. Such debates often transcend national boundaries. 
In the international sphere, expectations of expectations between and 
among societies are often not clearly established. Views on how people 
"ought" to act vary widely from nation to nation. Consequently, the sys- 
tem of norms that potentially would be distilled into international law is 
often ill-defined or non-existent. This is true even on the level of the most 
basic human rights.'68 The process of codifying international law requires 
an ongoing negotiation between different societies' norms and expecta- 
tions, a negotiation that takes place in language. Yet, in order for the law 
to function in the international arena, language must also juggle the dual 
roles of solidifying expectations and enabling adaptability. This task of- 
ten requires surgical precision-a task further complicated by the exis- 
tence of language barriers. These barriers exist even among nations that 
ostensibly share a language. One of the best examples of this phenome- 
non is the Trail Smelter Arbitration between the United States and Can- 
ada. 
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water 
. . . ." 33 U.S.C. 5 125 1 (a)(l)-(2) (2000). 
Hannah Arendt, noting that all attempts to codify so-called "eternal Rights of Man" 
into a set of international governing principles have failed, cites Edmund Burke's observa- 
tion that human rights are an "abstraction" and that it makes more sense to claim that the 
privileges one enjoys are the "rights of an Englishman" rather than inalienable human 
rights. This is because rights spring from within the nation rather than from universal, 
international norms. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 298-99 (1979); 
see also JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 3 4  (1999) (seeking to formulate a system of 
norms that transcends national boundaries and is based on a liberal ideal of justice). 
Heinonline - -  28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 108 2004 
20041 Standing, Environment, and Other Contested Terms 109 
B. The Trail Smelter Arbitration 
The Trail Smelter Arbitration is one of the most influential pollu- 
tion-related disputes in international law.169 The arbitration arose from a 
cooperative effort by the U.S. and Canada to mitigate the damage and com- 
pensate those injured by airborne pollutants that had crossed into the 
U.S. from Canada. A principal problem facing both the parties and the 
arbitrators involved the lack of consensus definitions within the interna- 
tional community for the key terms: pollutant and damage.I7O This same 
problem-lack of common definitions-recurs in different form in Laid- 
law. 
I .  History of the Smelter and the Arbitration 
The Trail Smelter was built in 1896 in Trail, British Columbia. During 
the ensuing years, emissions from the smelter drifted across the border 
into Washington and fell in the form of acid rain and acid fog. Substan- 
tial property damage ensued.17' In 1928, individual claimants collectively 
agreed not to pursue claims against the company that owned the smelter, 
opting instead to wait while the matter was negotiated on a diplomatic 
level. In 1931, the Canadian-United States International Joint Commis- 
sion concluded that the smelter had caused $350,000 worth of damage in 
the United States, with future damages to be determined and the amount 
adjusted to reflect changing conditions.17* While the original award was 
paid, the amount was never adjusted to reflect damages incurred after 
193 1 In 1935, the matter went into arbitration. 
In 1941, the arbitration tribunal rejected the United States' claim for 
more than $2 million in additional damages, awarding it a total of only 
$78,000.174 The tribunal based its decision in part on a finding that for- 
eign emissions (i.e., pollutants) do not cause legal damage unless and 
until that damage is actual, provable, and sub~tan t i a l . ' ~~  The tribunal's 
'69 See Alfred P. Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50 OR. L. 
REV. 259, 259 (1971) ("Every discussion of the general international law relating to pollu- 
tion starts, and must end, with a mention of the Trail Smelter Arbitration."). 
I7O See, e.g., id. at 268: 
The word "damage" was purportedly defined as  "such as would be recoverable 
under the decisions of the courts of the United States in suits between private in- 
dividuals," but it seems clear that the tribunal was in fact not defining damage at 
all with this language, but defining "damagesw-the extent to which there should 
be monetary recovery for "damage." The importance of this confusion in lan- 
guage, and therefore in logic, cannot be emphasized too strongly. 
17' See 3 R.I.A.A. 1907, 1917 (1941). 
' 7 2  See id. at 1917-19. 
I7'See id. at 1919. 
'74  See id. at 1940. 
I7jSee id. at 1931-33; Rubin, supra note 169, at 273. 
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finding effectively meant that foreign emissions caused no legal damage 
until that damage was quantified. Thus, environmental degradation is not 
actionable in and of itself. Rather, there must be an "environmental 
plaintiff' by and through whom the damage may be assessed. Only then 
can the action succeed. Under this regime, as in Laidlaw, the focus shifts 
from the impact of foreign emissions on the environment to the impact of 
foreign emissions on people's relationship to the environment. While the 
tribunal did lay out the principle that nations must be responsible for 
transboundary pollution, it found that only those claims that were quantifi- 
able could succeed; those which could not be quantified necessarily 
failed.176 In effect, the decision introduced the Roman concept of sic utere 
ut alienum non laedas (one should use one's own property in such a manner 
as not to injure that of another) to modern international environmental 
law.'77 However, requiring such explicitly defined proof of harm to justify 
compensation effectively hamstrung the principle's future app1i~ation.l'~ 
According to the decision, if an injury could not be measured in 
monetary terms, there was no damage and, hence, no remedy at law. Con- 
sequently, the United States received no compensation for having been sub- 
jected to the smelter's noxious fumes because no proven environmental 
harm res~1 ted . I~~  Similarly, the tribunal refused to hold Canada liable for 
damage to urban property in the U.S. because "there [was] no proof of 
facts sufficient to enable the Tribunal to estimate the reduction in the 
value . . . of such pr~per ty ." '~~ 
According to the tribunal's findings, the fouling of a nation's air by 
another nation is not compensable unless and until the damage can be 
precisely appraised. Nor can a country seek damages when foreign emis- 
sions harm wildflowers, birds, or any other resource that has no assigned 
176 See 3 R.I.A.A. at 1965: 
[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner 
as  to cause injury by fumes in or to the temtory of another o r  the properties or 
persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is estab- 
lished by clear and convincing evidence. 
'77 See Brian R. Popiel, Comment, From Customary Law to Environmental Impact As- 
sessment: A New Approach to Avoiding Transboundary Environmental Damage Between 
Canada and the United States, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 447, 451 (1995); Martin D. 
Gelfand, Note, Practical Application of International Environmental Law: Does It Work 
Atoll? 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 73,77 (1997). 
178 While the passage of the decision enjoining states from allowing their temtory to 
be used in such a way as to harm the territory of another is often hailed as a major step 
forward in international environmental law, one commentator has noted that this portion of 
the decision is pure dictum and predicated solely on American law. As such it created "no 
unequivocal customary international law." Shashank Upadhye, The International Water- 
course: An Exploitable Resource for the Developing Nation Under International Law?, 8 
CARDOZO J . INT'L & COMP. L. 61 ,86  (2000). 
179 See 3 R.I.A.A. at 1932. 
180 Id. at 1931. 
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monetary value.'s' The rationale for the decision stems from the tribunal's 
attempt to assign fixed definitions to value-based and mutable terms like 
pollutant, damage, and harm. 
2. Parallels to Laidlaw 
Consider again the situation in Laidlaw. Friends of the Earth decried 
Laidlaw's discharges into the North Tyger River. Laidlaw argued (and the 
district court agreed) that the discharges caused the river no harm.ls2 The 
Supreme Court accepted this determination for purposes of the river's 
ecology but decreed that the perception that the company's discharges 
caused harm, in light of the company's admitted violations of the Clean 
Water Act, constituted legal harm.Is3 The dispute in Laidlaw, then, is not 
over the level of discharges, or whether they occurred, but about whether 
the damage they caused amounts to legal harm and, if so, how to quantify 
that harm-the same issues which arose in the Trail Smelter Arbitration. 
By requiring a showing of injury to the plaintiff for standing in Laidlaw, 
the Court effectively finds that Clean Water Act violations (including 
serious toxic events) that do not implicate humans in some manner are 
not actionably harmful. This holding is similar to the Arbitration Tribu- 
nal's conclusion that damages that cannot be quantified in economic terms 
do not constitute legal injury. In both cases, the impact of the defendant's 
actions on the environment was subordinated to the impact of the defen- 
dant's actions on the plaintiff. 
From a systems theoretical perspective, this result is completely ra- 
tional. Systems theory posits that problems do not exist unless and until 
they generate communication within the system. While "[flish or humans 
may die because swimming in the seas and rivers has become unhealthy 
. . . [a]s long as this is not the subject of communication it has no social 
effect."ls4 In other words, until it is articulated, a disturbance (no matter 
how ecologically significant) will not affect the system. It follows that if 
communication about a disturbance can be suppressed, the system's func- 
tioning will continue unimpaired. This can cause (and has caused) seri- 
ous problems as polluters attempt to cover up their misdeeds,ls5 thereby 
Is1See Rubin, supra note 169, at 265: 
If the tribunal's decision as to the indemnity owed by Canada to the United States 
for "damage" resulting from the operation of the smelter is viewed as a definitive 
statement of international law, the absence of any item of intangible damage . . . 
implies that general international law permits a state to fail to regulate injurious 
effusions that drift into the territory of a second state, as long as the damage done 
is not directly translatable into a provable cash sum. 
I s *  See Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). 
I s 3  See id. 
LUHMANN, supra note 12, at 28-29. 
IS5See, e .g . ,  JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1991) (chronicling the litigation aris- 
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removing their actions from the realm of communication and rendering them 
nonevents.lS6 
In Laidlaw and the Trail Smelter Arbitration, communication about 
the respective disturbances was not so much suppressed as stymied. The 
parties lacked the necessary vocabulary to adequately describe the injury. 
The Trail Smelter Tribunal could not find a consensus definition within 
the international community (a loose confederation of linked social systems) 
for the term "damage" and so chose to confine its scope to those injuries 
that could be quantified in monetary terms. Similarly, the Laidlaw Court 
faced the problem of defining environmental harm in terms that con- 
formed to the tenets of traditional property interests (and thereby with 
standing doctrine) even as the injury itself defied such easy categoriza- 
tion. Because of the nature of environmental citizen suits-the statute 
requires no injury and the plaintiff herself seeks no monetary damages- 
the Court could not meet its goal and was forced to reframe the issue as 
one of measuring injury to the plaintiffs. 
While the Laidlaw decision hinges on standing, it does so only be- 
cause of the Court's continued unwillingness to recognize that the issues 
before it were not truly procedural (i.e., whether the plaintiffs satisfied 
the criteria for standing) but were rather questions of fact and substantive 
law. Perhaps this is because nothing short of a fundamental restructuring 
would cure the woes of standing doctrine, and the Court is understanda- 
bly reluctant to take on such a task. 
In addition, the issues in Laidlaw, as with many of the Court's semi- 
nal cases on standing and the environment, are much broader. More than 
the validity of the plaintiffs' right to sue, the Court must address the ques- 
tion of how our culture defines harm outside the confines of traditional 
ing from one such attempt). 
ls6 This phenomenon is well illustrated by the controversy over whether entities regu- 
lated by environmental laws should be allowed to self-audit to determine their compliance 
with federal and state laws and then to remediate any violations without suffering any 
penalty. Seventeen states have adopted some form of self-audit law: Arkansas, Colorado, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hamp- 
shire, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. See Rena Steinzor, 
Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors: The Homeland Security Act and Corporate Ac- 
countability, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 641, 663 11.60 (2003). The rationale for such a 
policy is that regulated entities would theoretically police themselves more regularly and 
thoroughly if the results of their investigations could not then be used against them in gov- 
ernment enforcement actions. Opponents of the self-audit framework (including the EPA) 
argue that such a regime actually gives entities an incentive to violate (by allowing them to 
reap the economic gain from their misdeeds), and then to "discover" the problem and fix it 
without penalty. See id. at 663; see generally Lisa Koven, The Environmental Self-Audit 
Evidentiary Privilege, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1167 (1998), Brooks M. Beard, The New Envi- 
ronmental Federalism: Can the EPA's Voluntary Audit Policy Survive?, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 
1 (1997). The controversy can be analyzed in systems theoretical terms. The regulated 
entities look to suppress communication in order to eliminate systemic disturbance 
whereas the self-audit regime's opponents maintain that the system's ability to function 
depends on effective communication and response to disturbance rather than elimination of 
potential disturbance through suppression of information. 
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property interests and specifically within the context of environmental pro- 
tection. This same issue is addressed in a different context in the novel 
Animal Dreams, to which we now turn. 
C.  Animal Dreams and the Rhetoric of Environment 
I .  The Novel 
A~limal Dreams is set in the fictional town of Grace, Arizona, where 
the indigenous Hispanic community faces the acidification of its river by 
the Black Mountain Mining Company. When the mine became unprofitable 
to run, the company laid off the local workers and began leaching acid 
through its enormous tailings piles in order to extract the minerals still 
contained therein.Is7 The acids used in this process seeped into the water 
table and the river, leading to the death of the river's aquatic life as well 
as the crops and trees that depended on the water for survival.'88 
This devastation of the local ecosystem did not concern the mining 
company. It had determined that damming the river and desiccating the 
town could circumvent the environmental laws protecting the town's wa- 
ter supply. Damming the river would remove the river from the jurisdic- 
tion of the EPA, thereby enabling the company to continue its leaching 
activities. lS9 
In the face of this looming catastrophe, the women of the town band 
together and successfully challenge the monolithic power of the Com- 
pany and the silently complicit EPA. They succeed in having the town 
designated a national historic place, thus protecting both the town and the 
river from further encroachment from the mining company.'g0 Once listed 
as an historic site, the town need no longer fear "the onslaught of indus- 
try" nor "demolition or other negative i rnpa~t ." '~ '  Invoking government 
regulations to protect the town offers a stark contrast to the regulatory 
inertia of the EPA that permitted the problem to escalate. 
Though the town of Grace is saved and the novel ends on a happy 
note, the town's historic status offers no long-term implications for sys- 
I8'See BARBARA KINGSOLVER, ANIMAL DREAMS 43-44,63-64 (1990). 
188 See id. 
See id. at 1 1  1 .  When Codi Noline, the protagonist, naively assumes that a report to 
the local authorities will halt the leaching operation, Viola, the town matriarch, quickly 
disabuses her: 
"Dam up the river," Viola said. "That's all they have to do to meet with the EPA 
laws. Dam it up and send i t  out Tortoise Canyon instead of down through here 
. . . . [I]f Black Mountain dams up the river, it's out of the jurisdiction of the Envi- 
ronmental Protection Agency." 
Id. 
See id. at 274-77. 
l9! Id. at 277. 
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temic reform. It merely spares one town a dismal fate. Similar situations 
will inevitably occur in other locales. This prospect blunts any sense of 
elation the reader might otherwise feel at Grace's salvation. The most 
that victories like Grace's can offer is pleasure tempered by a grim aware- 
ness of things to come.192 
2. The Subject of Harm 
Although the preceding thumbnail sketch omits the novel's subtlety 
and richness and thereby does the work a terrible disservice, it conveys 
enough of the plot to illustrate my point. For present purposes, the novel's 
importance inheres in the differing visions of harm evinced by the towns- 
folk of Grace and the managers of the mine, respectively. It is not just 
that the parties differ about whether harm occurred. More fundamentally, 
they differ on the essential nature of the term. 
Grace's inhabitants view the mine's leaching operation as pernicious 
to the community and to the region.'93 The river and the water it carries 
are integral to their culture and to the well being of the town, as well as to 
the crops upon which the local people depend for sustenance. The river's 
demise will doom the community as well. For the people of Grace, this is 
clearly an unacceptable scenario. 
From the company's perspective, however, poisoning the river amounts 
to an insignificant side effect of a beneficial process. The Company's 
publicist might describe the acid leaching operation as a "recycling" of 
the tailings to extract surplus value from already processed material and 
thereby provide the greatest possible return to shareholders. The river is 
not vital to the firm's continued profitability, and its contamination poses 
no danger to the mine's ~iabi1i ty. l~~ On the other hand, damming the river 
will serve two simultaneous, beneficial purposes: it will free the company 
from the regulatory oversight of the EPA, and it will destroy the town of 
Grace. Destroying the town will eliminate the power base of the grass- 
roots resistance to the mine's operation. 
The opposing views represented by the mine and the townsfolk--each 
of which represent a different systemic perspective-reiterate the flexibility 
See CASSUTO, supra note 143, at 117-19. 
193 See KINGSOLVER, supra note 187, at 179 (Codi Noline, invited to speak to a gath- 
ering of the women of Grace (which she calls the "Stitch and Bitch C l u b ) ,  observes that 
"the Stitch and Bitch Club would officially sanction mass demonstrations against Black 
Mountain's leaching operation, to be held daily on the dam construction site . . . . 
Unofficially, the Stitch and Bitch Club would have no objection if a bulldozer met with 
premature demise."). 
194 See id. at 6 3 4 4  (discussing the effect of the river's acidification on the local or- 
chards-the spread of "poison ground." As one Grace resident observed: "They're getting 
gold and moly out of them tailing pipes. If they wasn't, they wouldn't keep running the 
acid through them. They're not going to stop no leaching operation on account of our pe- 
can trees.") 
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of the term "pollutant." The mining company considers the sulfuric acid 
an asset (and the river extraneous). Grace's residents, by contrast, view 
the acid as a pollutant (and the river as essential). If pollution means 
matter out of place, or a foreign object interfering with the efficiency of a 
given system, both sides are correct.195 Clearly, terms like "unnatural," 
"harm," and "pollutant" must be regarded as creations of the systems that 
give them meaning. In addition, when one considers the infinite number 
of systems, all of which are observer-defined (which is to say their bounda- 
ries are a function of perspective) and self-interested, consensus definitions 
for terms like harm and pollutant seem unattainable grails. This is not a 
"problem" with language; it is rather language giving expression to the 
inherently contingent nature of the concepts themse1ves.l" 
The concept of harm should link to the health and well-being of the 
social system and the system's ability to perpetuate itself, rather than tying 
itself to an uneasy compromise between and among our limited scientific 
knowledge, tenuous commitment to conservation, and the unyielding de- 
mands of a market economy. Such an approach would not identify the 
natural environment; it would instead acknowledge the complex interre- 
lationship between and among all members of the social system (human 
and n ~ n - h u m a n ) , ~ ~ ~  as well as the shared imperative of the system's self- 
reproduction. Furthermore, since the system depends on the environment 
to spur evolution (without which it would stagnate and die),198 it stands to 
reason that the well being of the system's environment is integral to the 
system's overall integrity and longevity.lg9 
V. LAIDLA w AS WATERSHED-SUGGESTIONS FOR A 
STANDINGLESS JURISPRUDENCE 
Returning to Luidlaw, we must ask what the mutability and subjec- 
tivity of terms like harm, pollution, and even environment mean for the 
law of standing and the workability of the Clean Water Act and other envi- 
ronmental laws. As the foregoing discussion makes clear, using harm to 
the environment as the determinative criterion for standing-as the dis- 
sent suggests-is untenable. Multivalent and constantly shifting perspec- 
19= Cf: Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J.L. & ECON. I (1960) 
(pointing out that the allocation of legal entitlements implies an environmental harm if a 
polluter owns the right to pollute, or an economic harm to the polluter if other parties own 
the right to be free from polluting). 
'%See LUHMANN, supra note 13, at 182. 
Ig7 See CASSUTO, supra note 143, at 129-3 1 .  
198 Systems require disturbance to evolve. If there were no environmental disturbance, 
the system would not need to adapt. It would become inert, essentially lifeless. See id. at 
125. 
'"See, e.g., BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN 15 (Catherine Porter 
trans., 1993) (noting the need to describe our "discursive constitution" through which we 
"[define] humans and nonhumans, their properties and their relations, their abilities and 
their groupings"). 
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tives, as well as the expanding boundaries of scientific knowledge, make 
any such determination impossible. Yet removing the environment from 
the standing equation in an environmental statute, and focusing exclu- 
sively on injury to the plaintiff-as the majority advocates-is equally 
unfeasible. The issue of harm (or injury) is a substantive, fact-based query 
and must be treated as such. 
A. Letting the Statute Dejine the Injury 
Judge Fletcher has suggested reworking the notion of standing to 
make the operative query be: whether or not the injury alleged falls 
within the category of injuries that the statute was enacted to prevent.'"" 
This formulation would satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Arti- 
cle I11 without falling prey to the caprice of modern standing doctrine. 
Because the statute's enactment would create a substantive legal right, it 
follows that the statute's violation would create a legal injury.201 In Laid- 
law, for example, the inquiry would not address who was injured or how. 
No such investigation would be necessary because the Clean Water Act 
plainly states that simply violating the Act creates a legally cognizable 
injury. Therefore, the plaintiffs' standing would hinge on the court's de- 
termination that the manner of violation alleged was a type the statute aimed 
to prevent. 
In the case of Laidlaw, the court would ask whether the discharge of 
pollutants into the North Tyger River in excess of permitted amounts was 
something that the Clean Water Act was designed to prevent. The an- 
swer: of course. The Act mandates water quality standards designed to 
"restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
the Nation's waters" by eliminating the discharge of  pollutant^.^^' Entities 
wishing to discharge effluents must obtain permits and adhere to the 
limitations contained therein.203 The statute further states that entities that 
violate the terms of the Act are subject to citizen In Laidlaw, we 
have a company discharging more mercury (a heavy metal and a CWA 
pollutant) into a waterway than its permit allows. It is hard to imagine a 
category of injury that fits more neatly within the statutory parameters 
than this one. 
The Fletcher approach has the dual advantages. of comprehensibility 
and workability. It eliminates unproductive inquiries into the nature of 
2W See Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, supra note 11, at 223-24; see also Sun- 
stein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 1 I, at 166-67. 
20' As Fletcher argues, this is the very essence of statutory (rather than Constitutional) 
injury. For the Court to go further and evaluate whether the injury defined by Congress is 
judicially cognizable "limits the power of the legislature to articulate public values and 
choose the manner in which they may be enforced." Fletcher, supra note 11, at 233. 
202 33 U.S.C. 8 1251(a) (2000). 
203 See 33 U.S.C. 5 1342 (2000). 
204See 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a) (2000). 
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the injuries suffered by the named plaintiffs as a result of the Act's vio- 
lation. All that would be required for a citizen suit to lie is for the plain- 
tiff to allege an injury of the type enjoined by the statute.205 
B. Subjectivity Remains-The Galileo Problem 
Under this new regime, the problem might appear resolved. Unfor- 
tunately, it is not. As noted earlier,206 the Clean Water Act defines "pol- 
lutant" to include biological material, rock, sand, and heat,207 all of which 
occur naturally both in and out of waterways. While each of these phe- 
nomena can potentially disrupt an aquatic ecosystem, each is also a natu- 
rally occurring component of those ecosystems. Though standing juris- 
prudence (including Laidlaw) has long acknowledged that threatened 
harm is sufficient for citizen it does not acknowledge that such an 
admission throws the meaning of the term pollutant, as well as the stated 
aim of the Clean Water Act, into flux. Furthermore, if the determinative 
criterion for designating pollutants were the potential to cause harm, the 
definition would encompass virtually everything-both human-made and 
naturally occurring.209 
A phenomenon becomes a pollutant only if it disrupts the function- 
ing of a given system. Even then, it becomes a pollutant only from the 
point of view of that particular system. As we saw in Animal Dreams, 
one system might view sulfuric acid as harmless or even beneficial, while 
another would classify it as a dangerous pollutant. Consequently, at- 
tempts to legislate for pollutant-free waterways are destined to fail. 
These attempts will also create imbroglios like the one in Laidlaw, where 
the Court found the defendant liable for an admittedly harmless dis- 
charge of pollutants even though a harmless pollutant amounts to a con- 
tradiction in terms. This situation arose because a supposedly objective 
definition of a contingent term (pollutant) was inserted into a statute de- 
signed to protect an equally mutable concept (the environment). This is 
2M See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 264-65. 
206 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
207 33 U.S.C. 0 1362(6) (2000). 
208See, e.g., Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. 167, 1 8 6 8 1  (2000) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)); Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling 
Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 155-61 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (following h i d l a w  to find that 
affiant sufficiently alleged injury when defendant's alleged NPDES violations threatened 
the environmental quality of water adjoining affiant's property, even though plaintiff may 
not have produced sufficient evidence to prove actual harm). 
209 While a pollutant may cause harm only in certain concentrations and, thus, there 
might not be harm from a discharge that failed to reach that concentration, this simply 
underscores the nebulousness of the term. If pollutants are classified based on their poren- 
rial to cause harm, then all things are pollutants to varying degrees. This would be an im- 
possible standard around which to craft laws. For example, the goal of the Clean Water 
Act-the elimination of pollutants in the nation's waterways, see 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a) 
(2000)-becomes completely meaningless. 
Heinonline - -  28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 117 2004 
118 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 28 
an example of the law using the rhetoric of science to lend an air of ob- 
jectivity to its provisions. In short, it is what I call a Galileo Problem. 
Galileo Problems come from grafting a veneer of objectivity onto prod- 
ucts of human thought and language. Galileo's views implicitly demon- 
strated that the laws of astronomy were not divine, immutable, and ob- 
jective, but actually contingent, knowledge-based, and normative. This 
precipitated a crisis of faith in the legitimacy of the law.210 Systems and 
environments can affect no pretense of ob j e~ t iv i t y .~ '~  Consequently, harm 
to any given system is subjective and context-dependent and can only be 
defined within that narrow context. Any attempt to broaden the meaning 
of harm to encompass multiple systems inevitably dilutes the term be- 
yond the point of utility. 
Laidlaw illustrates this nicely. Harm, for purposes of the Clean Wa- 
ter Act, arises from the discharge of pollutants into waterways. "Pollut- 
ant" is context-dependent and is no longer referential absent a showing of 
harm. But under Laidlaw, discharging pollutants into waterways is not 
necessarily harmful, nor must a discharge be harmful to be actionable. It 
follows then that a substance need not be harmful to be a pollutant under 
the statute. Yet, pollutants are harmful by definition. If a pollutant need 
not cause harm, then it seems that anything at all could be a pollutant 
(and indeed, under the statute's definition,this is very nearly the case). 
Thus, any discharge of anything by anybody into the vicinity of a water- 
way theoretically falls under the regulatory aegis of the Clean Water Act 
and potentially requires a permit. Furthermore, a citizen may prosecute 
any failure to adhere to discharge limits so long as that citizen believes 
that the discharge could cause or has caused harm. This is, of course, an 
impossible scenario and not the intended consequence of the Laidlaw 
d e c i s i ~ n . ~ ' ~  
In light of the foregoing, it becomes clear that the Fletcher method 
of determining standing by assessing whether the injury alleged is a type 
the statute was designed to prevent will not wholly resolve the standing 
issue in the environmental arena. Without further clarification of the 
meaning of "pollutant," it does no good to decree that discharges of pol- 
lutants into waterways are the type of injury that the Clean Water Act 
was designed to prevent; the statement is meaningless. States will have 
no guidelines upon which to base their permitting processes, and citizens 
210As one commentator rhetorically asks, "Is the court [that judged Galileo] right or 
wrong? . . . Since justice speaks performatively and since what it says begins suddenly to 
exist by the sole fact that it says it, since justice gives rise to jurisprudence in any case, 
what indeed does it matter. . . to be wrong or right?" SERRES, supra note 8, at 82. 
211See supra note 162 and accompanying text; GREGORY BATESON, STEPS TO AN 
ECOLOGY OF MIND 454-55 (1972) (discussing the notion that "territory" is a series of 
maps and representations created by observers; territory, the thing itself, can never be seen. 
"All 'phenomena' are literally 'appearances."'). 
2'2See h i d l a w  IV, 528 U.S. at 183-84 (comparing plaintiff's allegations of harm to 
those found inadequate in previous cases). 
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will have virtually unfettered ability to contest actions by entities that 
impact waterways. This is precisely the type of administrative bedlam 
envisioned by the 
C. Solving the Galileo Problem-A New Rhetoric of 
Environmental Protection 
I .  The Well-being of the Social System as the Criterion for Injury 
How can this Galileo-based problem of legal terminology and appli- 
cation be resolved? I suggest that, using Judge Fletcher's elegant frame- 
work as a starting point, it becomes possible to craft a flexible and there- 
fore functional definition of harm that facilitates the operation of the 
Clean Water Act and its sister statutes. 
The legal system is a sub-system designed to maintain the health and 
continued survival of the larger social system. Laws, as products of the 
legal system, are enacted in furtherance of that goaL2I4 All systems, in- 
cluding the social system, share the twin imperatives of self-reproduction 
and self-preservation.215 Perhaps the best way to measure legal harm is to 
determine whether the disturbance complained of negatively affects the 
social system's health and longevity. 
The goal of the Clean Water Act is to "restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."216 
The statute identifies the interposition of pollutants into those waters as 
negative and mandates their elimination in order to ensure, among other 
things, that fish, shellfish and wildlife can thrive, as well as to enhance 
recreational opp~rtunities.~" To achieve that goal, the Act allows for citi- 
zen suits in the event of any type of violation, regardless of whether the 
illicit behavior causes actual harm to the envi r~nrnent .~ '~  
213 See id. at 201-02 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
214 Some critics maintain that the legal apparatus serves to perpetuate its own legiti- 
macy and ossifies rather than enables the social system. According to Robin West, the legal 
system- 
through its symbols, language, arguments, and general control over the means of 
normative legal discourse--creates in the citizenry what the critics sometimes call 
"clusters of beliefs" in the overriding legitimacy of the social structures of 
empowerment and disempowerment that constitute the larger society of which the 
legal system is only a part . . . . The result is that the vast bulk of the particular 
rules and the process of the extant system that govern our behavior are seen as  
morally legitimate-as in accord with our moral beliefs. Meaningful criticism of 
law against truly independent moral standards is thereby frustrated. 
ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY & LAW 5-6 (1993). 
215 See PAULSON, supra note 146, at 121-27. 
216 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a) (2000). 
217 Id. 5 125 1 (a)( 1-2). 
218 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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The breadth of citizen suit authority suggests that the statute's draft- 
ers were as concerned with the integrity of the statutory regime as with 
the abatement of imminent threats to the nation's waterways. From a 
systems theoretical perspective, this is quite reasonable. The system func- 
tions by eliminating threats to itself. Those threats need not be ecosys- 
temic; they can also arise when system components break the rules (as 
codified by the legal system) through which the system functions. Laws 
that are neither obeyed nor enforced undermine societal expectations of 
expectations and imperil the system's functioning. For example, if one 
cannot expect motorists to stop for red lights, there is little reason to have 
red lights. Without them, chaos would soon engulf the streets. Motorists 
would drive blindly into intersections until a new traffic regime was codified 
and everyone once again adhered to a common set of norms. 
The traffic analogy carries over into environmental law. Neither the 
federal government nor individual states have the resources to enforce every 
environmental law in every instance. As a result, they enforce selectively, 
focusing on only the most egregious  violation^.^'^ This selective en- 
forcement means that regulated entities would have little to fear if their 
violations did not reach a level where they became an agency priority. 
Given the breadth and scope of environmental laws, this would mean that 
the laws would be breached more often.220 Citizen suits have traditionally 
filled this enforcement gap.22' 
The rationale for citizen suits is the same as that for state enforce- 
ment actions. There need not be an actual and quantifiable injury for a 
law to be enforced. Rather, when the law is not enforced, the law itself is 
threatened and that threat in turn imperils the system and all its compo- 
nents. The drafters of the Clean Water Act (and other environmental stat- 
219 See Adler, supra note 28, at 49. 
2 2 0 T h i ~  is arguably the case now. According to one survey, only thirty percent of cor- 
porate counsels felt it was possible for their companies to comply fully with state and fed- 
eral environmental laws. See id. Some would argue, as Adler does, that the inability of 
regulated entities to comply with the various environmental laws, coupled with the ease 
with which citizens can file suit, makes for a haphazard enforcement regime that does little 
to protect the environment. See id. at 5 9 4 2 .  However, Adler's contention that citizen suits 
lie at the root of the problem (and that the Laidlaw framework further undermines the goal 
of environmental protection by easing standing requirements) does not address what I 
believe to be the real issue-the irrelevance of injury to the plaintiff and the amorphous- 
ness of harm to the environment. Neither forms an effective criterion for standing. Adler 
argues that citizen suits are often driven by special interests rather than a desire to benefit 
the environment and that Laidlaw's holding will only exacerbate this phenomenon. See id. 
at 59. However, as discussed above, benefit (and harm) to the environment is subjectively 
determined and inherently variable. Restricting citizen access to the courts will not change 
that. All it will do is enhance the ability of violators to flout the law. If there is a problem 
with the current regulatory regime, (and few would deny that it is a ponderous and byzan- 
tine set of laws), it would seem more efficient to focus on making the laws more coherent 
and effective rather than hamstringing citizen enforcement capabilities. 
221 See Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan?, supra note 11, at 165 (noting that 
Congress has used the citizen suit as  "a mechanism for controlling unlawfully inadequate 
enforcement of the law"). 
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utes) were clearly aware of this possibility and created a private right of 
action to help contain it. 
Applying this perspective to Laidlaw, Friends of the Earth could 
have argued that Laidlaw's actions threatened the social system by poi- 
soning the river in a manner proscribed by the Clean Water Act. Laidlaw 
could have responded that its discharges were negligible, the river's bi- 
otic health unimpaired, and the system's smooth functioning never en- 
dangered. In addition, Laidlaw's violations were redressed by a state en- 
forcement action and the payment of a fine. Consequently, according to 
Laidlaw, there would be neither need nor basis for further litigation. 
Faced with these facts, the Court should have little trouble finding 
that the suit is viable and that plaintiffs should prevail. Polluted water- 
ways threaten the longevity and self-reproductive capacity of the sys- 
The Clean Water Act was enacted to protect the system from just 
these types of dangers and creates rules governing acceptable levels of 
Under the Act's standards, a substance that causes no harm 
under certain conditions may nonetheless be regulated if its discharge 
poses a threat to the system's welfare.224 This method conforms with an 
approach that classifies pollutants according to their potential to cause 
harm to a given system. Though mercury may not cause discernible dam- 
age at low concentrations, it remains appropriate to regulate its discharge 
because it is toxic to marine life (and humans) and can bio-accumulate. 
Consequently, its presence threatens the system's ability to survive and self- 
reproduce. If multiple regulated entities exceeded their discharge limits, 
the resulting mercury concentrations in the river could threaten the integ- 
rity of the ecosystem as well as the health of the people who use the 
river. Thus, the system itself faces peril. 
When Laidlaw's mercury discharges exceeded permitted levels, it 
created a threat to the system as well as an impediment to the system's 
goal of attaining and maintaining clean water and a smooth functioning 
regulatory apparatus. Laidlaw's actions therefore negatively impacted the 
system's health and reproductive capability. Therein lies the harm. The 
222 When the Senate Conference Committee was considering the bill creating the Clean 
Water Act, Senator Muskie referred to water pollution as  "a cancer" that "[wle have ig- 
nored for so long that the romance of environmental concern is already fading into the 
shadow of the grim realities of lakes, rivers and bays where all forms of life have been 
smothered by untreated wastes, and oceans which no longer provide us with food." LEGIS- 
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 107, at 161-62. 
223 See id. at 164 (noting that the statute's statement of goals, including the elimination 
of discharges of pollutants, is "not merely the pious declarations that Congress so often 
makes in passing its laws" but is rather "literally a life or death proposition for the Na- 
tion"). 
224 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 
(4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that threatened 
rather than actual injury can satisfy Article 111 standing requirements . . . . Threatened 
environmental injury is by nature probabilistic. And yet other circuits have had no trouble 
understanding the injurious nature of risk itself."). 
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Clean Water Act allows for a private right of action to redress that harm. 
Consequently, Friends of the Earth's citizen suit seems perfectly appro- 
priate. It should not be necessary to show that Laidlaw's actions caused a 
measurable degradation of the ecosystem nor injury to a particular person 
in order for the suit to lie. 
An analysis based on a determination of whether the system is 
threatened will likely allow standing for virtually any allegation of 
statutory violations, assuming the statute at issue has a citizen suit provi- 
sion. Such a result seems both reasonable and beneficial.225 The citizen 
suit is designed to enable citizens to function as private attorneys general. 
Public attorneys general are charged with protecting the system from 
threats born of violations of the law. To prosecute a case, they need show 
no more than that an actionable transgression occurred. The basis for 
legal action lies in the law violated and the nature of the transgression. 
The same reasoning should carry over to citizen suits. The current doc- 
trine requires plaintiffs to allege injury to themselves despite the statute's 
focus on the environment, and the Fletcher framework would require po- 
tential litigants to allege injury of a type that the statute was designed to 
prevent (thereby necessitating an unwieldy inquiry into the type of injury 
alleged). In contrast, the system-based approach eliminates the need for 
an injury analysis by making it implicit. A threat or injury to the legal 
system constitutes a threat or injury to all components of the social sys- 
tem. If the threat is actionable under a statute containing a citizen suit 
clause, then a citizen may bring suit to redress it. 
This approach does not run afoul of Article I11 since it too involves a 
case or controversy, injury, and a method of redress. Under this approach, 
however, courts would no longer be able to bar suits on the grounds that 
plaintiffs have not alleged adequate injury to themselves. Instead, the harm 
to the system would suffice and the suit could be adjudged on its merits. 
2. Diligent Enforcement 
The only remaining obstacle to justiciability lies with the fact that 
Laidlaw's actions already were the subject of an enforcement action by 
the state. In light of the suit and subsequent settlement between Laidlaw 
and the DHEC, the question becomes whether the system's health and 
longevity is threatened by a violation that has already been the subject of 
an enforcement action. The statute's language suggests otherwise; it bars 
citizen suits that follow state a ~ t i o n s . " ~  We must consider whether the 
facts of the case are such that the injury alleged continues to threaten the 
225 The workability of this scenario is predicated on well-drafted, workable statutory 
definitions. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
226 See 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(b)(l)(B) (2000). 
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system's health and longevity and therefore whether the injury remains of 
the type that the statute was enacted to prevent. 
The Court squarely and correctly addresses this issue. Laidlaw's 
permit violations occurred both before and after FOE filed suit. The suit 
was filed after the state reached its settlement with laid la^.'^' It is there- 
fore possible to conclude: (1) that the state enforcement action was not 
diligently prosecuted, as the Act requires;228 and (2) that the ongoing viola- 
tions posed a continuing threat to the health and integrity of the system. 
Furthermore, vigorous enforcement (as opposed to imposing a token fine 
and exacting a pledge to do better) will likely deter similar activities by 
other entities, thereby protecting the system from future threat.229 Conse- 
quently, the injury alleged by FOE was of the type the statute was de- 
signed to prevent and the Court correctly sustained the plaintiff's verdict. 
3. Summary: A Long-term Solution to a Long-term Problem 
The crucial differences between the Court's method for adjudicating 
environmental disputes and the one presented here are that under the pro- 
posed framework, (1) statutes' stated goals of environmental protection take 
precedence over what are often contrived or ancillary injuries to plaintiffs; 
(2) unwieldy and extraneous standing inquiries become unnecessary; and 
(3) the relevant terminology gains coherence, which in turn brings the 
concept of "environmental protection" into focus. Environmental protec- 
tion is less about preserving nature than about acknowledging the inter- 
relatedness of systems and environments. Because the boundaries be- 
tween system and environment shift constantly, the notion of environ- 
ment must remain forever in flux. The key to environmental protection 
therefore lies in eschewing rigidly defined boundaries and rules and in- 
stead adopting norms capable of responding to changing conditions. In 
this sense, the social system's imperative of self-preservation impels it to 
act as its own environmental protection agency.230 
A scheme like the one just described would constitute a significant 
departure from the status quo. At present, both the legal system and the 
larger notion of environmental protection lack structural integrity. The 
majority opinion in Laidlaw is but one example of a widespread tendency- 
as evidenced by the Trail Smelter Arbitration and Animal Dreams exam- 
ples-to create laws and regulatory frameworks based on supposedly objec- 
227 Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. 167, 178 (2000) (noting that after FOE commenced its action, 
Laidlaw violated the mercury discharge limits thirteen times, as well as committed twenty- 
three other violations). 
228 See Laidlaw 1, 890 F. Supp. 470, 498 n.l (D.S.C. 1995); Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 
167. 
229 See Laidlaw IV, 528 U.S. at 185-86. 
230 See generally Timothy Luke, On Environmentaliry: Geo-Power and Eco-Knowledge 
in the Discourses of Contemporary Environmentalism, CULTURAL CRITIQUE 30, 57-82 
(I 995). 
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tive definitions of subjective concepts like harm, pollution, and environ- 
ment. 
Within the social system, language presents choices and possibility 
while law provides the delimiting force that narrows possibility and sol- 
idifies expectations.231 But if language is used to present false choices, as 
with the majority's opposition of injury to the plaintiff versus harm to the 
environment, the law's authority is undermined, the shared expectations 
of expectations that enable the system's functioning are crippled, and a 
legitimation crisis becomes inevitable. In Laidlaw, the Court avers that 
all that need occur for standing is for the plaintiff to believe she has been 
injured. That formulation, though well intentioned, cannot long survive. 
Because of its ruling, the Court faces the daunting prospect of having to 
select which types of perceived injuries enable standing under the various 
environmental statutes-an overwhelming and constantly evolving task. 
The net result of this untenable state of affairs is that societal expec- 
tations vis-b-vis environmental protection are eroding. This erosion does not 
stem solely from the Laidlaw opinion but rather from an overall lack of 
discipline and clarity in the rhetoric of environment and environmental 
protection. This imprecision generates false oppositions that present false 
choices. Consider, for example, a President and Congress arguing about 
whether to open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil exploration or 
to continue our national dependence on foreign oil. In the Northwest, the 
false oppositions are between salmon and prosperity, or owls and timber. 
In the Midwest, debates over corporate average fuel economy pit the vi- 
ability of the auto industry against increased fuel efficiency for motor 
vehicles. These types of choices, though specious, are omnipresent. 
False choices arise as much from linguistic subjectivity as from 
ideological differences. The inability to see past the rhetoric to imbedded 
inconsistencies within the debate comprises a root cause of our environ- 
mental dilemma. A workable template for "environmental protection" 
must allow for the fact that many of the key terms in the debate-in- 
cluding environment and protection, as well as harm and pollution-lack 
consensus definitions. The goal, however, should not be defining these 
terms; their meaning is intertwined with their subjectivity. Instead, we 
must acknowledge that subjectivity is inherent within both the language 
and the human condition. This requires crafting laws that allow for lin- 
guistic uncertainty and for the shifting nature of norms and expectations. 
The alternative involves drafting and interpreting laws in a manner that 
defies an essential component of the human experience. The latter method 
has been the policy up to now. It is time for a new approach. 
231 See LUHMANN, supra note 13, at 82. 
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D. Postscript: NEPA and the Rhetoric of Environmental Protection 
As the preceding discussion has shown, pollutants cannot be elimi- 
nated; the goal itself is meaningless. One system's pollutant is another's 
necessity. It is therefore understandable that courts get tangled in discus- 
sions of harm and the intent and coverage of the various environmental 
protection laws while the statutes' varied language creates serious diffi- 
culties 'for enforcement and judicial review. Statutes do exist, though, 
wherein the language of subjectivity is woven into the text. One of the better 
examples of this is NEPA.232 Though strictly procedural in nature and 
thus often emasculated in its application, NEPA contains language that is 
admirably precise in its acknowledgment of the subjectivity of harm and 
in its attempts to articulate contexts and benchmarks through which to 
measure that harm. 
Though it  lacks the statutory means to enforce its stated goals,233 
NEPA nevertheless makes it a matter of policy for federal agencies to use 
all practicable means to administer federal programs in the most envi- 
ronmentally sound manner possible.234 This proviso resembles language 
in most other environmental statutes and is too general to be meaningful. 
However, subsequent language clarifies its intent. For example, NEPA 
speaks of the need to "assure for all Americans safe, healthful, produc- 
tive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing  surrounding^,"^^^ to "pre- 
serve important historical and cultural aspects of our national heritage,"236 
to "enhance the quality of renewable resources,"237 and to "achieve a bal- 
ance between population and resource use."238 This language lays out the 
systemic priorities the statute seeks to protect and provides the rhetorical 
tools with which to do so. 
Returning to the Animal Dreams example, one can readily see how 
the Black Mountain Mining Company could argue that damming the river 
23242 U.S.C. $5  4321-4370 (2000). 
233 NEPA requires any proposed federal action to be evaluated for its environmental 
impact. See infra note 240 and accompanying text. Once the study has been prepared, 
however, there is no mechanism under NEPA through which to evaluate the merits of the 
proposed action in light of its anticipated environmental impact. 
234 See 42 U.S.C. 5  4321: 
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy which will encour- 
age productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to 
promote efforts which will prevent o r  eliminate damage to the environment and 
biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understand- 
ing of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and 
to establish a Council on Environmental Quality. 
235 Id. 5  433 1 (b)(2). 
236 Id. 5  433 1 (b)(4). 
237 Id. 5  433 1 (b)(6). 
238 Id. 5  433 1 (b)(5). 
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and destroying Grace would be "safe" and "productive."239 However, it is 
hard to imagine the company straight-facedly maintaining that the dam 
would preserve important historical and cultural aspects of our national 
heritage. It also seems unlikely that the company could persuade a court 
that the dam would enhance the quality of renewable resources, or 
achieve a balance between population and resource use. Consequently, if 
held to the standards enumerated in NEPA, the Company's dam proposal 
would die on the vine. 
NEPA requires that agencies proposing actions evaluate potential 
environmental consequences.240 The Council on Environmental Quality 
("CEQ"), whose primary function is to advise the President on environ- 
mental matters,241 has stated that these evaluations must consider public 
health, unique features of the region, precedential effect of the action, 
and any anticipated controversy.242 If the Trail Smelter tribunal had 
evaluated these factors, it almost certainly would have concluded that the 
damages incurred by the local population in Washington were cogniza- 
ble. The acid rain and acid fog generated by the smelter fumes posed a 
health risk that should have been evident even in 1938, and the pollution 
also severely affected the region's unique features (e.g., the farmland of 
the Columbia River basin). Moreover, the precedential effects of a ruling 
that denied the existence of damages except as might be measured in 
monetary terms were foreseeable and considerable. Finally, the contro- 
versy arising from the smelter's emissions was already present and clear. 
The language in NEPA is useful because it is flexible and provides a 
basis to demarcate systemic goals. These goals are norms--expectations 
of expectations, and shared visions of how things ought to go. The norms 
of preserving esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings, protect- 
239 See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
240 See 42 U.S.C. 5 4332(2) (2000). That evaluation can and often does take the form 
of an Environmental Impact Statement. Id. 5 4332(2)(C): 
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible . . . all 
agencies of the federal government shall . . . include in every recommendation or 
report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the re- 
sponsible official on- 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the pro- 
posal be implemented, [and] 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action . . . . 
24'See id. $ 5  43424344.  The CEQ is a creation of NEPA. Its interpretations of the 
statute are entitled to substantial judicial deference. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 
358 (1978). 
242 See 40 C.F.R. 5 1508.27(b)(1)-(10) (2003); see also Dinah Bear, NEPA at 19: A 
Primer on an 'Old' Law with Solutions to New Problems, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 10060, 10064 
(1989) (discussing factors an agency should consider to determine whether a proposed 
action has 'significant effects' for NEPA purposes). 
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ing the public health and geographically unique features, and avoiding 
controversy govern the statute's interpretation while remaining adaptable 
to changes in circumstance. This language outlines a normative frame- 
work through which the statute can function and allows its interpreters to 
gauge the severity of any alleged injury by measuring it against systemic 
priorities. This goal-driven flexibility enables the legal system to articu- 
late expectations while allowing them to shift within established pa- 
rameters. 
The flexibility of the language employed in NEPA is broadly appli- 
cable within environmental law even as its terms remain subject to de- 
bate. Disputants may contest, for example, whether a given action delete- 
riously impacts public health, an issue that readily lends itself to litiga- 
tion and judicial resolution. Contrast this with Laidlaw, where the parties 
could not agree on whether harm occurred, and if so, to whom or to what. 
Faced with all this uncertainty, the Laidlaw Court decreed-in contra- 
vention of the statute-that the issue of whether the waterway had been 
harmed was all but irrelevant to whether plaintiffs could sue. In addition, 
despite the lack of reference in the statute to the well-being of citizens 
bringing suit, the Court nevertheless determined that the viability of the 
lawsuit hinged on the plaintiffs having suffered injury. This type of sce- 
nario, wherein the Court loses sight of a statute's goals because of an 
uneasy relationship with Article 111, would be less likely to occur under a 
regime where the statutory language did not pretend to objectivity, but 
instead acknowledged the influence of the social system on both its crea- 
tion and interpretation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Environmental law differs in fundamental respects from laws based 
on traditional property interests. So  too must the rhetoric in which such 
laws are framed. Current standing doctrine has no place in environmental 
jurisprudence, where injury to the plaintiff has little relevance. A case 
like Laidlaw, where the Court finds itself adjudicating an issue that has 
no connection to the governing statute (in addition to making no sense), 
underscores an incoherence that endangers the larger goal of environ- 
mental protection. The problem of standing for citizen suits raised by 
Laidlaw is but a symptom of a larger problem arising from the use of 
contingent language to set supposedly concrete goals. As the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration and Animal Dreams examples demonstrate, such attempts 
cannot succeed and can severely undermine the integrity of the legal 
system. They merely exacerbate a Galileo Problem based in entrenched 
notions of valuation drawn from traditional property-based norms. 
Since both harm and environment are subjectively determined, the goal 
of environmental protection must be flexible and similarly subjective. 
The common denominator among the multiple perspectives is member- 
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ship in the social system. Each entity and component system shares the 
imperative of maintaining the smooth functioning of the social system. 
Norms are constructed and statutes enacted to further that goal. Rather 
than relying on an unworkable notion of standing to determine the vi- 
ability of a cause of action, courts should consider whether the injury 
complained of is of the type the statute seeks to prevent and whether it 
threatens the health and longevity of the social system. This framework 
satisfies the dictates of Article I11 while enabling the legal system to re- 
spond to both the contingency of language and the flexibility of norms. 
Therefore, contrary to the infamous sentence from Laidlaw with which 
this Article began, the relevant showing for purposes of Article I11 need 
be neither injury to the plaintiff nor harm to the environment. Instead, 
the viability of citizen suits should derive from the ambit of the statute 
and its role in maintaining the well being of the social system. 
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